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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This project was designed to outline transportation chapters of a planned written history of 
Oregon land use planning, written in ways that would make the transportation planning 
profession relevant to a popular audience. The writing would focus on stories from the 
profession, and on historical facts and events in Oregon transportation planning history that 
would surprise or enlighten popular reading audiences. Technology transfer would occur through 
publication of one or more written pieces of work. 
 
The result is a topical and historical tale entitled “A Brief Portrait of Multimodal Transportation 
Planning in Oregon and the Path to Achieving It, 1890-1974.” 
 
Sources told stories with enthusiastic reference to past transportation events. The structure 
chosen was an interwoven collection of topical essays, arranged chronologically but skipping 
sideways, sometimes backward or forward, from stage to stage – national, metropolitan, state 
governmental, local – but always moving forward in time. The tale presented here takes the 
reader through tumultuous early years, up to the moment in 1974 when statewide planning goals, 
including Goal 12, the transportation goal, were adopted by the Oregon Legislature. 
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The intent of this project, as presented to OTREC reviewers in early 2007, was to ensure 
attention to the transportation component of a planned popular history of land use planning in 
Oregon, and to tell stories from the transportation planning profession that would make the 
profession relevant to a popular audience.  
 
The scope was presented as a “modest historical-journalistic research and writing project,” with 
the following intended work products:  
 
• enumeration of interfaces between transportation and land use planning in Oregon 
• timeline of significant events in Oregon transportation planning 
• conversations with important past and present players 
• discovery and compilation of important information sources  
• discussion of current debates about Oregon transportation planning 
• one or more pieces of writing and effort at publication 
 
In imagining the sort of content that could emerge from the research process, the author chose to 
highlight “stories of vision; stories of grinding dedication; stories of tremendous creativity and 
innovation; stories of conflict,” as well as important historical facts and events in Oregon 
transportation planning that would be likely to surprise or enlighten popular reading audiences. 
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DESCRIPTION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACTIVITY 
 
As proposed, technology transfer would occur through publication of one or more written pieces 
of work. 
 
 
OUTCOME AND RESULTS 
 
In fulfillment of his grant obligation the author hereby submits the topical and historical tale that 
begins immediately below, entitled “A Brief Portrait of Multimodal Transportation Planning in 
Oregon and the Path to Achieving It, 1890-1974.” 
 
The process of engaging and researching the subject matter revealed its complex nature; this was 
described in a preliminary final report. One writing approach considered at that time – eleven 
parallel essays on each of eleven facets (“The Planners,” “The City,” etc.) – was discarded as 
insufficient. The other approach considered, a single, unified essay, was chosen. In the writing 
process, the approach expanded organically into a collection of topical essays. 
 
It had been clear early on that an ideal way to structure the material would be chronological. 
Source after source began the stories they told with enthusiastic reference to a transportation 
event in the 1920s, 1930s, 1950s, etc. It seemed essential to build up the unfamiliar subject 
matter for lay readers by presenting origins.  
 
An arrangement that suggested itself early on proved to have good logic: chronological, but 
skipping sideways, sometimes backward or forward, from facet to facet, stage to stage – national, 
metropolitan, state governmental, local – but always moving forward in time. 
 
It proved impossible in the time available to write about each facet in each epoch broadly enough 
to do it justice, narrowly enough to keep the flow moving quickly, and still write the entire story 
of Oregon transportation planning to the present day. The result is a reasonably well-integrated 
history, but only up to the moment in 1974 when statewide planning goals, including Goal 12, 
the transportation goal, were adopted by the Oregon Legislature. 
 
 
FURTHER ACTIVITIES 
 
Extensive research and interviews were conducted dealing with events from 1974 to the present 
day. It is very much to be hoped that the rest of Oregon’s transportation planning history, 
especially surrounding development of the Transportation Planning Rule and its adoption in 
1991, will be written in due course.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On September 12, 2009, a new flock of Portlanders received an invitation to leave their cars at 
home. With the opening of the Green Line, TriMet, the regional transit agency, expanded its 
MAX light rail system to 53 miles of track serving five termini. For residents of growing 
neighborhoods in Oregon City, Canby, Happy Valley, Sandy and Damascus, suddenly NOT 
driving but commuting downtown by transit, became – maybe – a realistic option. 
 
What goes into individuals’ transportation choices? Some things are usually within their control: 
where they live, what they value, how they budget time. Most people are optimizers. Does it save 
money and time to take light rail? Or will running the lunchtime errands become too 
inconvenient without a car. 
 
Some people will respond to pleasures of the new line. They will like watching the world go by, 
or riding with neighbors – maybe grinning from the oddity of a brand-new way of moving about. 
Some will be persuaded by a news story, a colleague’s entreaty, or an office memo that it is up to 
them to do their share to reduce congestion, save oil, and slow greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Other things are less within people’s control. The carless will feel relieved by the reduction of 
their enforced commute from 60 minutes by bus to half of that by rail.  
 
One thing that most will not think to question is: who made this system? We certainly didn’t. 
Cars and roads, driveways and freeways, trucks and trains – they just are. The same goes for the 
arrangement of places traveled from and to – home and shopping, school and work. We don’t 
control the physical system that exists; we live with it. It mostly works. 
 
However, anyone noticing the number and tone of local transportation and land use news stories 
will suspect that the system evolved through clamor and debate. This is true in most places; it 
may be especially true in Portland and it is plenty true throughout Oregon. Over the years, people 
have challenged most aspects of Portland’s transportation system, and they continue to do so. 
Their style has spread to many places around the state. Often, citizens have shown that they do 
have some control, or at least influence. 
 
Rarer are those who question the worth of automobiles. Not only do we live with cars, we really 
are stuck with them. They work, but they dominate. A strong car-despising subculture has 
existed in the U.S. at least since the early 1960s, and has its adherents in Oregon. Still, nobody 
believes automobiles can or will be done away with soon. Portland is renowned for transit and 
cycling, but most of its citizens drive. Suburbs are served well enough by bus, but are laid out for 
driving. Smaller cities work to maintain transit systems, mostly for the elderly and poor, but 
there and in small towns and rural areas, cars are simply what there is. 
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There are many who consider car-hating false. “I wish we didn’t have to vilify automobiles, 
relative to transit,” said Craig Greenleaf, who has worked as both a land use and transportation 
planner. “Road improvements are necessary to facilitate transit.”1 
 
There are those who consider it pointless. Political scientist James Dunn argues for an “auto-
plus” world, “taming the excesses of automobile-based transport” but preserving personal 
mobility – which, in any case, will “never be given up once it is achieved.”2 
 
And admittedly, vehicle miles traveled (VMT) are few, by comparison, outside of cities. 
However, developing transportation options in places away from Portland would be of relatively 
small consequence for fuel conservation and greenhouse gas reduction were it not for the ways 
that cars enable distance, promote spread-out development, and shape commercial geography, 
vividly so in growing or booming towns such as Bend.   
 
Much if not most of the state’s transportation planning consists of planning for automobile use – 
as well as freight transport by road, rail, water and air; long-distance passenger transport by rail 
and air; and systems, interconnections, and land use decisions that bring all of these together. In 
truth, more than one Oregon transportation professional who started out as a smart-growth 
crusader ended up dedicated to the realities of planning for a functioning “multimodal” system.  
 
Even so, “multimodal” is often used as code for “fewer cars” and since the early ‘70s, an anti-
car, “multimodal” drumbeat in Oregon has kept the conversation bent toward practicable options 
and change in individual travel behavior, with notable successes. The VMT-reduction edge to 
both transportation and land use planning in Oregon has been given a huge boost by the specter 
of climate change. 
 
With its statewide land use program, urban growth boundaries, Transportation Planning Rule 
(TPR), active (often activist) citizenry, progressive-dominated government, and, in Portland, 
modern history of transit investment and self-consciously alternative urban self-concept, Oregon 
has gone further, for longer, and been more successful than most places in pushing back against 
automobiles’ dominance of environment, lifestyle, and landscape. 
 
Two moments in time brought particular change. In shifting away from freeway-building in the 
1970s, Portland-area and state planners decided that transportation decisions and infrastructure 
need no longer dictate land use but could serve it. And with the 1991 TPR, Oregon became a 
pioneer in managing what has been called the transportation-land use connection. The rule’s 
drafting was a collaboration between road planners weary of seeing projects defeated and land-
use planners and activists wanting to reduce VMT. It recognized roads not as lines on a map but 
as lineal land uses having land-use impacts. It demanded local transportation system plans that 
addressed all modes, weighed multiple options, and coordinated with land use policies favoring 
compact urban form. It also ensured that planned land uses would not overwhelm road capacity, 
to the delight of engineers. In all of these regards, it has not worked perfectly but it has worked. 
 
                                                 
1 Craig Greenleaf, interview with author, August 2009 
2 James A. Dunn, Jr., Driving Forces, 1998, p. 169 
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Whether in collaboration or acting independently, Oregon’s idealists, activists, futurists and 
contrarians hold considerable power. Their first coalescence in the 1970s was thanks to an 
import, the anti-freeway movement. Their rapid evolution into a litigating anti-sprawl force, led 
by the watchdog group 1000 Friends of Oregon, became an export when “1000 Friends” groups 
sprang up in other states. PSU professors Sy Adler and Martha Bianco observe that Friends, as 
the dominant contrarians, function as a third agent within a “corporatist” arrangement, that is to 
say, mirroring unions in that they keep both government and the private sector on their toes3. 
 
But Friends and their allies are also dreamers. As with the TPR, a recurring dynamic in modern 
Oregon transportation (and land use) planning is between those who deal in what is, and those 
who deal in what could or ought to be. The two sides meet in practically every transportation 
planning debate – usually around the merits of more or fewer roads and highways, more or less 
land and distance dedicated to settlement.  
 
These two sides met in the two biggest land-use-and-transportation debates in Oregon history – 
the killing of the Mt. Hood Freeway and the defeat of the West Side Bypass, each of which 
directly brought about a new understanding of the relationship between land use and 
transportation – the land-use-first ethic and the state’s “Goal 12” in the first instance, the TPR in 
the second. They meet again today in debate about proposed freeway bridge improvements 
between Portland and Vancouver, WA, called the Columbia River Crossing, possibly the 
granddaddy (grandson, actually) of all the state’s transportation debates. 
 
Throughout the history of Oregon transportation planning, Friends has played its part. So have 
other activists and organizations; planners and thinkers; politicians and civic leaders; lobbyists 
and business activists. With them, engineers, economists, wonks, transportation geeks, federal 
laws, national trends, and state and local cultures have played a role as well. 
 
The story of Oregon’s “multimodal” transportation planning must be written in such as way as to 
inform our commuter – the one tuning in to the transportation clamor – about the system he 
thinks just is, how it got there, and how and why he should appreciate its substance. As much as 
possible, the story, as it is begun here, relates complex subject matter to his life and times, 
delving into the big controversies that come from society’s deep disagreement over conservation 
and development, aesthetics and wealth. It dips into older history, then moves more or less 
chronologically. In order to do justice to the various practitioners and players, it includes four 
stages of action: the national, the metropolitan, the state governmental and the local.  
 
A full history to the present day would also attend to some of the less attended-to aspects of 
transportation planning, the ones that do not as often appear on newspapers’ front pages. These 
include freight planning and its relationship to the business and corporate communities; the 
specialized work of modelers, system-design technologists, economists, and intelligent-
transportation engineers; and the visions, dreams, schemes and projections of futurists, whose 
imaginings in bygone eras truly led to the very infrastructures we see today. Some current 
visions - from hydrogen highways to cycle-towns, bullet trains to electric-car cities, biofueled 
                                                 
3 Martha Bianco and Sy Adler, “The Politics of Implementation,” PSU Center for Urban Studies, 
November 1998, p. 2 
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states to right-priced thoroughfares - will become the daily environments of tomorrow, while 
other visions fade away.  
 
In the full story of Oregon transportation planning to the present day, eight themes are 
prominent:  
 
(1) The importance of money. It takes vast sums to build any large piece of infrastructure, 
and transportation infrastructures are as large and expensive as any. Meanwhile, even 
vaster sums are at stake in the connections, development opportunities and jobs that new 
(and lasting) transportation infrastructure represents; this influences every transportation 
planning decision.   
 
(2) The creative tension between smart-growth planning advocates inside and outside of 
government and transportation professionals who are well-disposed toward smart growth 
but who have had their hard edges ground off by transportation realities.  
 
(3) The cultural continuity among contrarian community activists, not only within but 
outside of 1000 Friends of Oregon, who with the Columbia River Crossing battle seek to 
extend this continuity.  
 
(4) The large cultural and practical gulf, regarding transportation needs and perceptions, 
between the dominant Portland metro area and its satellite towns and every other part of the 
state.  
 
(5) The equally vast – but also evolving – gulf between the Portland metro area and its 
Southwest Washington satellites, Vancouver and Clark County.  
 
(6) The key, evolving problem of transportation planning for new and growing places such 
as Bend.  
 
(7) The long-standing – and always evolving – creative tension between the two state 
agencies involved in transportation planning, the Department of Land Conservation and 
Development (DLCD) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). 
 
(8) And, finally, a lesson that is planners’ daily bread but critical for thinking about 50 
years’ evolution: incrementalism. Something started now, whenever that now might be, 
creates increasing divergence over time from what would have been had the something not 
been started. 
 
Dominated by the automobile we remain, even in Oregon. There are some who are perfectly 
content with that, and many more – the center, the majority – who simply play the reality game, 
dealing with what is. But in the modern history of Oregon transportation planning, there is a big 
place for what could or ought to be. 
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1.0  ANOTHER QUIET YEAR IN THE TRANSPORTATION 
NEWS 
 
As a point of departure, consider Oregon’s current transportation issues and the ways they are 
discussed: probably not too differently from those in other places, but with plenty of 
environmentalist concern mixed in. This year, our imagined commuter, tuned in to the 
transportation debates, would have seen the Oregon Legislature pass House Bill 2001, raising 
$300 million annually and funding billions in road and non-road transportation projects, as well 
as HB 2186, which adopts low-carbon fuel standards and mandates metro-area greenhouse gas 
emission planning.  
 
A six-cent gas tax hike, the first since 1993, was approved as part of HB 2001 (and might go to 
voters if signatures are gathered), even while the state got national attention for experimenting 
with GPS-tracked mileage fees4 instead of gas taxes, which are generally considered out-of-date 
as a transportation funding mechanism. The state’s Office of Innovative Partnerships is studying 
electric-car infrastructure, and Gov. Ted Kulongoski wants to attract electric-car manufacturers 
to the state. Tax breaks for hybrids are out, new ones for electric vehicles are in, and hydrogen 
cars are not yet fully discredited5. 
 
Portland’s regional government, Metro, unveiled its new Regional Transportation Plan 
identifying the Green Line’s next sisters – light rail to Milwaukie, Lake Oswego, Sherwood, and 
Gresham via Powell Boulevard. (Richard Kidd, the mayor of overlooked Forest Grove, was not 
happy6.) 
 
Oregonians were schooled in biofuel economics when two heavily state-subsidized corn-ethanol 
plants went bankrupt and a state ethanol fuel-percentage mandate was scaled back. However, 
new cellulosic ethanol technology may have found a viable feedstock and a new poster child in 
an enormous poplar plantation near Boardman7. 
 
High-speed rail is coming! President Barack Obama wants it and Oregon wants to get in on it. 
Commuter rail from Beaverton to Wilsonville has begun, complete with a noise dust-up, and 
could be extended to Salem8; freight rail from Eugene to Coos Bay has gone missing9. Coos Bay 
wants a liquid natural gas port, but Astoria isn’t so sure. 
                                                 
4 ODOT, “Oregon’s Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program,” 2007 
5 Roger Tattersall, “Devotee test-drives hydrogen fuel cars,” Portland Tribune 8/13/09, p. C7; 
Chris Paine et al, “Who Killed the Electric Car?” 2006  
6 Jim Redden, “Cities Fight to Avoid Being Left at Station,” The Portland Tribune, 8/20/09, p. 1 
7 Scott Learn, “Recession, new doubts take bloom off biofuels,” The Oregonian, 6/7/09, p. A1; 
Amy Hsuan, “Forest of Fuel,” The Oregonian, 9/6/09, p. D1; biofuel feedstock supplier is the 
Boardman plantation’s third “career”: it started as a paper pulp plantation   
8 Justin Carinci, “State studying WES possibilities,” Daily Journal of Commerce 7/7/09 
9 The Oregonian editorial board, “No way to run a railroad,” 5/1/08 
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Leaders in Coos Bay, distraught over geographic isolation, proposed for the nth time a 
completely new freeway, east-west across the south-central part of the state. They were 
supported by property-rights groups, but dismissed otherwise. 
 
A Newberg-Dundee bypass, an expensive new rural highway planned in order to save two car-
clogged wine-country towns (clogged in part thanks to a casino), creeps toward realization and 
has held a spot in the top-ten transportation stories for a decade; $192 million in state support 
created some of the loudest howls of the year, from bypass opponents.  
 
Erstwhile boomtown Bend bought faulty city buses but still really wants to try transit10, even 
while local leaders are focused on roads, interchanges, parkways, highway access, tweaking 
Salem noses (in company with many others outside the Willamette Valley), and building a new 
neighborhood called Juniper Ridge, its single access located amid a swarm of big-box stores on a 
five-mile commercial strip. 
 
Big nationwide transportation stories concerned automaker collapse, road stimulus funding and 
the dangers of driving while text messaging, which also was banned by Oregon along with non-
hands-free cell-phone use. The national transportation bestseller was Tom Vanderbilt’s Traffic: 
Why We Drive the Way We Do11. 
 
In Portland, east-side streets will sport extensions of the Portland Streetcar. Ray LaHood, the 
national Secretary of Transportation, visited town for the launch of the first American-made 
(Oregon-made) streetcar in 56 years, declaring Portland the “livability capital of America.”12 
 
Nimby-ism raised its head, first in West Linn, with local residents opposed to an embankment 
futuristically covered with solar panels to power freeway lights, and then in Ardenwald, part of 
Milwaukie, where planned light rail tracks will pass too high in the air for nearby residents’ 
comfort13. But with completion of the Green Line and Metro’s new plan, light rail is riding high. 
 
Cycling is, if anything, riding higher. Bend calls itself America’s best mountain-biking town; 
Eugene is considered one of the nation’s best bike towns, period; and the legend of Portland as 
cycle-town is growing to rival the city’s light-rail fame. This year new bike lanes, bike routes, 
bike maps, and intersection “bike boxes” debuted. A hotly disputed freeway bike bridge almost 
became reality. Four bike-sharing organizations vied for a city-sanctioned franchise. Conflicts 
flared over bike fees, bike deaths, bike rights, and bike attitude. Portland boasted the nation’s 
                                                 
10 Dennis Luke, interview with the author, June 2009; Patrick Cliff, “Planning a route to regional 
transit,” The Bend Bulletin, 8/10/09 
11 Tom Vanderbilt, Traffic: Why We Drive the Way We Do (and What It Says About Us), New 
York, Knopf, 2008 
12 Ray LaHood, speech at Oregon-made streetcar launch, Portland, 6/29/09   
13 Matthew Graham, “Ardenwald neighborhood livid about light-rail bridge,” The Clackamas 
Review,” 6/3/09 
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second-highest bicycle commuting rate as well as a definitive bike-culture book, Pedaling 
Revolution, written by Oregonian reporter Jeff Mapes14.  
 
Soaring above all other stories in media coverage – and rancorous dispute – was the latest tilt at 
solving a longstanding problem. The Columbia River Crossing, a bi-state fix for clogged 
commuter and freight traffic to and from Vancouver, emerged from a multiyear planning process 
as a physical-environment-bending, 12-lane bridge. The Crossing’s emergence coincided with 
that of a new environmental issue: climate change. Bridge opponents reacted with horror to a 
project that seemed to fly in the face of the looming crisis, to say nothing of 35 years spent 
resisting big, automobile-oriented projects. Locals for and against the bridge got schooled in the 
nuts and bolts of tolling, congestion pricing, and induced demand. 
 
And transportation talk continued its rise to the pinnacle of civic discourse through the work of 
devoted, transport-obsessed bloggers and activists at portlandtransport.com, pdxtransit.com, 
pdxtrains.blogspot.com, and rantingsofatrimetbusdriver.blogspot.com. Cyclists have their own 
champions and chatter at bikeportland.org and bta4bikes.org; anti-Columbia-River-Crossing 
activists host smarterbridge.blogspot.com and stopthecrc.wordpress.com; and even the anti-light-
rail community is a presence, at saveportland.com. 
 
                                                 
14 Jeff Mapes, Pedaling Revolution, Corvallis: OSU Press, 2009 
 10
 11
 
2.0  THE TOP OF THE FERRIS WHEEL 
 
In terms of what is happening in local transportation planning, policy and implementation, what 
shows up in the news represents the tip of an iceberg. The day before the Green Line’s launch, 
Oregon Congressmen Earl Blumenauer and Peter DeFazio were at PSU for the Transportation 
Summit. This was a multifaceted conference for transportation professionals from city, county, 
state and federal departments; research institutions; academe; and private planning, engineering 
and innovation firms. The summit was hosted by the Oregon Transportation Research and 
Education Consortium (OTREC), a federal center established within Oregon’s university system 
thanks to earmarked money from the 2005 federal transportation act called “SAFETEA-LU.”   
 
The “Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users” had 
been the latest in an unbroken string of federal transportation acts dating back to the Federal Aid 
Road Act of 191615. As with other big, issue-specific federal authorizations (such as farm bills), 
these packages of transportation policy, regulation, program-creation, and funding had evolved 
into a hexennial (sometimes quadrennial) Washington tradition.  
 
The tradition of fancy naming began only with the very progressive, transit-oriented Intermodal 
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, called “ISTEA” (before that, the Surface 
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 did not rate an acronym). 
 
“I guess I am the last man standing from the 1973 Oregon legislature, where we authorized a 
multimodal statewide transportation plan – nearly 20 years before ISTEA!” Congressman 
Blumenauer told gathered OTREC grantees in his enthusiastic, animated way. 
 
In one breath, the Congressman named the two modern heydays of transportation planning – the 
early ‘70s and the early ‘90s – and the holy grail of both: multimodality. It was clear that most 
attending the Transportation Summit believed a new heyday was at hand, that their car on the 
national transportation ferris wheel was once again nearing the high point, up in the bright sun of 
reason, making it just about a 20-year round trip. 
 
“I hope we will reset the nation’s transportation policy,” DeFazio told summit attendees, 
referring to SAFETEA-LU’s imminent expiration and Congress’s hearty rejection of President 
Obama’s wish to delay the next acronym for 18 months. “We have been limping along on the 
vision of Dwight David Eisenhower,” DeFazio suggested.  
 
In that breath, DeFazio took the transportation timeline back yet another 20-year cycle, to the 
early ‘50s – also a heyday, but in the mythology of multimodal transportation planning a sorrier 
one, when the vast interstate highway system was created, its final authorization coming with the 
1956 Federal Aid Highway Act. 
 
                                                 
15 For thorough compendium, cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal-Aid_Highway_Act 
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From his place of honor on the all-star summit keynote roster featuring PSU President Wim 
Wiewel, Portland Mayor Sam Adams, and retired TriMet guru Dick Feeney, DeFazio promised 
Oregon would be a laboratory for new transportation policy. He described four hoped-for tenets 
of the coming reauthorization: reduction of carbon emissions, accountability for dollars spent, 
“least-cost” engineering, and integrated land-use and transportation planning. 
 
The fourth tenet rang loud bells for most in the room. Following Oregon’s passage in 1973 of SB 
100, which created statewide land use planning, an exuberant parsing began of just what land use 
planning meant. From the beginning it was accepted that transportation planning was a key to 
land use planning, and the 14 broad planning goals adopted in 1974 included Goal 12 – 
Transportation.  
 
Goal 12 began as two goals, one for urban mass transit and another for freeways and major 
highways. As it happened, the swirling, early-70s land use dialogue based in Salem tapped into 
an even louder one occurring in Portland, also channeling the environmental, activist, and oil-
shortage sensibilities of the time. That dialogue would lead to the scuttling of two planned 
freeways, the birth of Portland-area light rail transit, and formulation of the grail of 
multimodality. 
 
“The Board believes,” said a document adopted in March 1974 by the Columbia Region 
Association of Governments (CRAG), the precursor to today’s Metro, “that our goal should be to 
develop an integrated multi-modal transportation system. ... The consultant to the Governor’s 
Task Force on Transportation has recommended a transportation and comprehensive planning 
program that should be endorsed and implemented.”16 
 
The governor was Tom McCall, a former KGW-TV newscaster and Secretary of State who 
served as governor from 1966 to 1974. The consultants were called System Design Concepts17. 
And the task force was the brainchild of Neil Goldschmidt, the future governor who was then 
Portland’s mayor and a principal architect of the dawning new era in Portland-area 
transportation. 
 
CRAG’s goal was a waypoint and the harbinger of a new ethic in transportation and land use 
planning. At the state level, as they did with the 13 other goals, the SB 100-created Land 
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) thought promptly and with some depth 
about land use implications. 
 
“A transportation plan,” their Goal 12, adopted in December 1974, finally declared, “shall 
consider all modes of transportation including mass transit, air, water, pipeline, rail, highway, 
bicycle and pedestrian ..., [shall] consider the differences in social consequences that would 
result from utilizing differing combinations of transportation modes ... [and shall] avoid principal 
reliance upon any one mode of transportation ....” 
                                                 
16 “CRAG Transportation Goal adopted March 15, 1974,” Oregon State Archives, LCDC 
records, 7/19/74 
17 System Design Concepts, “The Cooperative Transportation Planning Process in the Portland 
Metropolitan Area,” January 1975 
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“Plans for new or for the improvement of major transportation facilities,” the Goal continued, 
“should identify the positive and negative impacts on: (1) local land use patterns, (2) 
environmental quality, (3) energy use and resources, (4) existing transportation systems and (5) 
fiscal resources ...” 
 
It was a solid effort. Over the next 12 years, transportation planning became part of every city’s 
and county’s comprehensive land use plan.  
 
Ultimately, however, the state would need something more specific than policies and appropriate 
language written into local plans. It would need firmer direction for jurisdictions seeking either 
to site land uses that would require or impact transportation facilities, or to site transportation 
facilities that would create new access and thus impact travel times, land values, and 
development potential. This was the most significant transportation-land-use connection to be 
dealt with, one among many. 
 
In the early ‘90s, cultural and political riptides pulled the nation and local communities in 
contradictory directions. The final lap for 12 years of a conservative federal administration, high 
times for the anti-environmental Wise Use movement, and the start of a mid-East war coincided 
with important national environmental legislation, including 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, 
1991’s ISTEA and, in 1992, the developed world’s first ratification of a climate-change treaty18. 
Locally, tax-limiting Measure 5 arrived along with completion of Metro’s visionary 2040 Plan, a 
green light for west-side light rail, successful resistance against a controversial west-side freeway 
bypass, and the state’s 1991 Transportation Planning Rule (TPR), at last implementing Goal 12 
in tangible ways.  
 
The land use debate, begun in earnest with SB100, was about trying to arrange human settlement 
in efficient, utilitarian, compact, and aesthetically tolerable ways. In this it always bucked certain 
human behaviors usually exhibited within a system of free markets, status and choice: living in 
low-density suburbs, exurbs, the rural-urban fringe and truly rural areas was a post-war and to 
some extent a pre-war promise on which dreams (and fortunes) were built. 
 
The transportation debate, begun with the “withdrawal” of Portland’s Mt. Hood Freeway in 1974 
although not truly extended statewide until the TPR, was also about efficiency, support for land 
use goals, and even aesthetic tolerability. It also bucked human behavior, but in that regard it had 
an even harder row to hoe since the behavior it bucked was driving cars. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), U.S. ratification signed by 
President George H.W. Bush on October 13, 1992  
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3.0  AUTOMOBILE NIGHTMARES 
 
The conundrum of personal (non-freight) transportation is that human beings are large-ish, 
brainy yet physically soft and slow creatures who are activity-oriented, movement-oriented, 
distance-fascinated, play-seeking, competitive and maximizing, independent and territorial, yet 
who have always survived by increasing their numbers and living in groups. 
 
The work of getting humans where they wanted or needed to go, as quickly and comfortably as 
possible, with minimum effort and, as time went on, with maximum self-containment, was a sort 
of central project of civilization warranting every possible investment of brain, technology, and 
resource. In times of war – pretty much throughout human history – having the best 
transportation was a key to victory, and losing was not pleasant. 
 
The current state of development of the ideal – at least the most in-demand – form of human 
transportation is, and has been for just over 100 years, the automobile. This is true in U.S. cities 
as well as those in Europe, Asia, and the developing world. It is true in rural areas to the extent 
that roads exist to support transport.  
 
Investment in roads, of course, stemmed in large part from getting goods to market and back 
home again (and delivering mail!), but once roads existed, owning a personal vehicle usually 
became the norm and the aspiration. For anyone with adequate resources, owning an automobile 
meant independent mobility and economic advantage. Republican President Ronald Reagan, in 
the pre-ISTEA era, echoing the car-love his generation grew up with, called automobiles “the 
ultimate freedom.” They are considered desirable pretty much everywhere on the planet: Chinese 
cities once bedecked with bicycles now sport vehicular traffic jams, and even Europe’s best 
transit cities are still full of motor vehicles (carless Venice being about the only exception).  
 
With all of that, the automobile has big and obvious problems, and these are perceived by most 
people in most places. It runs on liquid fuels that have been in abundance but now become harder 
to come by, creating huge economic and political stresses. These fuels’ exhaust pollutes the air in 
and around human centers of activity. The automobile is fascinatingly enormous and inefficient, 
using many hundreds or thousands of pounds of metal machinery to move 150-pound humans 
around individually or in groups. It is ultimately hedonistic, making it all but effortless to get 
from home to work to places of recreation and commerce. 
 
Probably more than anything, the automobile - due to our size, its size, the speed demands of our 
lifestyles and the safety demands of our vulnerable bodies - dominates our environment. It does 
so in at least four ways: by the physical reality of the extensive pavement on which it runs; by its 
own very presence and numbers; by its impact on the nature and arrangement of places; and by 
its dependence-creating facilitation of distance. 
 
It is difficult to get a handle on, or find meaningful expression for, the degree of this dominance. 
People are everywhere; their activities are the very stuff of civilization and society; and 
everywhere people are, cars are. Yes, it is human movement that makes inhabited places vibrant 
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and creates commerce, but when practically every human movement occurs encased in a six-by-
fifteen-foot machine, the reality has grown physically out of proportion.  
 
For most of the post-car-love era, this dominance of the human environment has topped the list 
of grievances causing individual actors to tip over into open rebellion against the automobile. 
Two relatively recent books reflected and influenced debate: The Geography of Nowhere, from 
1994, by James Howard Kunstler19, and Asphalt Nation, written by Jane Holtz Kay in 199720. 
 
But a generation before them, in 1972, Ron Buel, a member of Goldschmidt’s staff in Portland, 
wrote a similar book entitled Dead End: The Automobile in Mass Transportation – How We Got 
Where We Are, How We Can Turn Around21. In Oregon’s case, it was elements of physical 
domination – freeways that would tear up neighborhoods, seas of downtown parking – that 
would be the poster children for revolution.  
 
Once automobiles became suspect, other grievances such as waste and pollution were not 
insignificant. Today, the matter of climate change, exhibited in Oregon conversations at the level 
of news, advocacy, policy, casual conversation and dispute, has topped the grievance of physical 
domination. At issue is the extent to which all human uses of carbon-based fuels produce carbon 
dioxide emissions (now usually called pollution), which, along with other compounds in smaller 
amounts, act as solar-energy-trapping greenhouse gas exacerbating gradual climate warming. At 
particular issue is personal automobiles’ share of CO2 emissions – about 15% in the U.S. (22% 
for all road transportation in the U.S., 10% worldwide)22. The climate-change problem is 
considered so threatening that it has brought action at state, federal, and international levels.  
 
From physical and technological perspectives, although not necessarily political ones, the 
personal transportation contribution to greenhouse gas ought to be solvable without too much 
difficulty. Government and private-sector innovators tackle it from three directions: reduction in 
vehicle use (or vehicle miles traveled, VMT, as through compact development, mass transit, 
bicycle use, pricing, and, ultimately, culture change); reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
through changes in the type of vehicle power plant used (electric, hydrogen, potentially certain 
biofuels); and changes in vehicle size and efficiency, per unit of energy used (higher miles per 
gallon of petroleum or biofuel, or miles per unit of electric charge). 
 
Not that it will be easy, but it should be doable. In matters of efficiency and power plant, the 
causal agents – automobiles – are easily traded out; they age quickly and can be replaced in short 
order, if the will is there, by newer and different ones (cash for clunkers!). This is so although the 
automotive industry’s infrastructure and economics have proven stubbornly intractable.  
 
                                                 
19 James Howard Kunstler, The Geography of Nowhere, New York: Touchstone, 1994 
20 Jane Holtz Kay, Asphalt Nation, Berkeley: UC Press, 1997 
21 Ron Buel, Dead End: The Automobile in Mass Transportation – How We Got Where We Are, 
How We Can Turn Around, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972 
22 John Conti, “U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Transportation Sector,” Energy 
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, July 2009 
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The problem of vehicle miles traveled is harder. New transit does get built, as Portland’s MAX 
demonstrates, and high fuel prices in 2007 did prove effective in causing changes in travel 
behavior, reducing VMT nationwide by about 11 billion miles (a 4.3% decline from March 2007 
to March 2008)23. But behavioral changes are limited when home and daily destinations are 
arranged in such a way that alternatives to individual motor transportation are barely practical. 
We have made our needs from our environment be all about distance; we are movement-
dependent, machine-transport dependent, and for now, automobile-dependent. American cities 
are the epicenter of this problem, but much of the developed and developing world, when built 
out, is built out following the dictates of automobile transport.   
 
So, economically practicable new fuels can be and already are being developed to replace 
petroleum. First-generation liquid substitute fuels already create fewer sulfur and nitrogen oxides 
and carbon particulates. Second-generation, non-liquid fuels, particularly electricity (especially if 
generated renewably), are in line to start lessening greenhouse gas emissions. Automobile size 
and weight are gradually shrinking. With these changes and with the increasing cost of driving, 
which will result in part from overdue attention to “right-pricing” the private use of public 
domain, particularly in cities, the universal and unreflective advantage taken of automobiles’ 
hedonistic comforts is due to lessen. 
 
However, after all of this, still the automobile’s dominance of our environment will be the 
symptom least easy to correct. We still live in a built world – likely to be as durable and enduring 
as all the centuries’ worth of built worlds that we still maintain – defined by pavement, parked 
and moving cars, car-shaped and car-arranged amenities, and everyday distance. The way that 
Oregon got here is the way that every other state got here. 
 
                                                 
23 Lena H. Sun, “Travelers Turn to Public Transit,” The Washington Post,” 6/3/08 
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4.0  EARLY OREGON ROADS 
 
In 19th century Oregon, before automobiles, there were wagon roads or riverboats, barges or 
railroads linking most of the same towns that exist today, small agricultural settlements that they 
then were. The Barlow Road, a private toll road around the south side of Mt. Hood, was 
Oregon’s first road in 1843. By 1851, a 10-mile Tualatin Valley plank road had been laid to 
bring wheat to Portland’s waterfront. Road quality was atrocious; in 1866, seven years after 
statehood, all men aged 21-50 were required to work two days per year building and maintaining 
county roads24. 
 
The national “Good Roads” movement was actually started by bicyclists, the League of 
American Wheelmen, around 1880. With the invention and spread of the automobile not long 
after, Good Roads became co-opted as a cause that would gradually compel huge governmental 
transport investment. New Jersey passed the first “state-aid road act” in 1892; the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture created the Office of Road Inquiry the following year. Lobbying for 
federal road funding was in full swing by the turn of the century, but did not bear fruit until 
191625. 
 
Oregon’s first automobile was purchased by E.H. Wemme in 1899. Washington businessman 
and booster Sam Hill and Governor Oswald West guided the Good Roads movement locally, 
working for development of quality long-distance roads in Oregon, a bit behind neighboring 
states. “Good roads are more than my hobby; they are my religion,” Hill once said26. He built the 
region’s first paved roads on his own land in Maryhill, WA, at his own expense, in 1911.    
 
Hill and West zeroed in on the 1913 legislative session to jumpstart state road planning and 
funding. Hill lectured throughout the state to generate awareness of roads’ benefits, and he 
invited West and the entire 88-member Legislature to Maryhill for a confab. Next, the pair 
charmed Portland’s business elite into supporting and funding the political campaign, having 
also inspired key members to fund the Columbia River Highway, planned starting in 1909. 
 
It all worked, with the Columbia River Highway’s intensely aesthetic design used effectively to 
tap into the public’s new auto-inspired touring fantasies27. The 1913 Legislature created the state 
Highway Department and its slogan, “Get Oregon Out of the mud,” along with an executive 
Highway Commission headed by West. It also appropriated $250,000 a year for road 
development, funded through property taxes28.  
 
                                                 
24 ODOT, “Oregon on the Move, a history of Oregon’s transportation systems,” n.d. 
25 John E. Tuhy, Sam Hill, The Prince of Castle Nowhere, Portland, Timber Press, 1983, pp. 129-
156 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 ODOT, “Oregon on the Move,” p. 12; Tuhy, Sam Hill 
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(West persuaded legislators to make the entire beach Oregon’s first “highway,” to reclaim it 
from those who would own it and to exercise the new department’s wings. According to former 
Metro head Mike Burton, West did this by calling the anti-beach-highway Senate President to his 
office, locking him in, then going downstairs for the successful floor vote29.) 
 
April 22, 1914, was proclaimed Oregon Good Roads Day, and that year the new commission 
approved the state’s first Highway Plan. This included nine key routes, foremost among them 
Oregon’s Portland-to-Ashland-to-California leg of the then-named Pacific Highway, the key 
inland route from Canada to Mexico. The other routes were from Seaside to Pendleton along the 
Columbia River; Pendleton to Ontario; Seaside to California along the coast; Portland to Albany, 
parallel to the Pacific Highway; The Dalles to Klamath Falls; Wasco to Lakeview; Eugene to 
Prineville; and Bend to Ontario30.  
 
Within a decade, all nine routes and several others were largely complete. In 1924, the state 
highway system consisted of 4,464 miles of roads, 720 miles of them paved and another 1,861 
miles surfaced with crushed rock. This was thanks to the 1917 authorization of $38 million in 
bonds plus $6 million more for truck roads, dedication of vehicle license fees to the Highway 
Fund, and passage in 1919 of the nation’s first gas tax, a penny a gallon. In 1924, there were over 
200,000 automobiles in the now-connected state31. 
 
County roads, the unheralded sisters of state highways, always far exceeded them in total road 
miles – although in the modern era these roads have been the subject of relatively few 
transportation planning disputes, due in part to Oregon’s restrictive rural zoning laws. Deschutes 
County’s road development history tells a typical tale: 143 miles of county roads created before 
the first year reported, 1879; 34 more miles by the turn of the last century; 52 more before 1910; 
223 more by 1920; and another 148 in the ‘20s32. Throughout the state, county resources were 
devoted to gradual and continuous opening of farm and market roads. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Mike Burton, interview with the author, May 2008  
30 ODOT, “Oregon on the Move,” p. 13; Tuhy, Sam Hill 
31 ODOT, “Oregon on the Move,” cf. p. 25 
32 Deschutes County, www.co.deschutes.or.us, Road Reports, “County Road Establishments by 
Year” 
 21
 
5.0  PETROLEUM, THE VHS OF AUTO FUELS 
 
Early in the 2006 documentary Who Killed the Electric Car, it is noted with chagrin that “one 
hundred years ago, there were more electrics than gas-powered automobiles. By 1920, the 
internal combustion engine had won.”  
 
Ethanol activist David Blume, in his 2007 book Alcohol Can Be a Gas, notes with equal chagrin 
that an “enterprising automaker of the [early 1900s] era preferred alcohol as a fuel. In fact, until 
1931, Henry Ford’s automobiles, including the Model T and later the Model A, were designed to 
run on either alcohol or gasoline .... Ford envisioned a day when the Industrial Revolution would 
benefit the rural landowner ....”33 
 
Today, both electricity and alcohol as fuel systems for powering cars are making a comeback; 
back then, both were outcompeted by the upstart, gasoline. Blume asserts that John D. 
Rockefeller’s principal product at Standard Oil was kerosene, distilled from petroleum and used 
for boilers and lighting. The volatile by-products were toxic waste, but eventually Rockefeller 
found a way to refine them into gasoline to run internal combustion engines.  
 
Blume, who believes in cooperative rural ethanol production, sketches out a conspiracy whereby 
the petroleum industry, which hated alcohol as a competing fuel, ruined a cooperative rural 
alcohol-production movement that started in Germany and was thriving in the rural U.S. The 
industry first slammed the movement at the outbreak of World War I as a dangerous foreign 
idea, then supported Prohibition, which killed it – at least long enough for gasoline filling 
stations to sprout everywhere.  
 
Canadian Darryl McMahon, who tracks electric vehicle technology at his website,  
econogics.com, believes that in fact, electrics were always far outsold by liquid-fuel vehicles, but 
still were holding their own into the nineteen-teens in terms of range, speed, and popular 
acceptance. Then in 1913, Chevron built the first gasoline station, “which started a boom in the 
building of these facilities until they were ubiquitous ... by 1920. In 1916 alone, over 200 
petroleum companies were established in the U.S., which coincides neatly with the decline of the 
electric car. Electrical recharging facilities were not nearly as common. Many ‘service stations’ 
would not have had access to an electrical grid at the turn of the century.”  
 
 
 
                                                 
33 David Blume, Alcohol Can Be A Gas!, Soquel, CA: The International Institute for Ecological 
Agriculture, 2007, pp. 9-16 
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6.0  EARLY METRO-AREA MASS TRANSIT 
 
The rise and fall of early-20th-century streetcars and interurban railways is a tale more often told 
than that of early electrics and alcohol vehicles. Considering modern efforts to rebuild urban rail 
transit capacity, the fact of these lines’ past existence and the extent of their former influence and 
physical reality sits like a huge and weeping child in the middle of the transportation planning 
story. 
 
The map from one of Dick Pintarich’s chapters in the book he also edited, Great and Minor 
Moments in Oregon History, is gasp-inducing. Interurbans run by five private companies once 
laced greater Portland and the Willamette Valley, with three lines out across Washington 
County; three more into Clackamas County with termini at Bull Run, Cazadero (past Estacada), 
and Mount Angel in Marion County; lines from Portland to Vancouver, McMinnville, and 
Eugene; and a west-side line from Forest Grove to Corvallis via Carlton, Amity, and 
Independence, which must have been sublime. The line to Oregon City ran every half hour past 
Oaks Park, which had been built by the transit company to attract ridership34.      
 
Inner Portland’s streetcar system was not much less impressive, with west-side lines to 
Multnomah, Hillsdale, Council Crest, Washington Park, Pittock Mansion, and Willamette 
Heights35. Like Oaks Park, the Vaughn Street baseball park, home to the Portland Beavers, was 
built by transit developers in order to attract riders36. East-side lines ran out along all of the same 
streets which (no coincidence) in the last 15 years have anchored Portland’s east-side 
neighborhood renaissance: Woodstock, Clinton, Division, Hawthorne, Belmont, Glisan, Sandy, 
Broadway, Alberta and Killingsworth. 
 
The first electric streetcars opened in 1889 (after 17 years of horsedrawn operation), and the first 
Portland-to-Oregon-City interurban (actually one of the first in the U.S. and the first to use long-
distance electric transmission) opened in 189337. Both systems had their heyday in the years just 
before World War I; the last streetcar ceased operation in 1950, and the last interurban in 1958. 
 
Electric rail mass transit and the automobile began together, at the same moment in time. One 
peaked as the other surged, one died as the other peaked, and one was reborn as the other lost its 
luster. Automobiles and mass transit always had an inverse relationship. 
 
This is not to say that automobiles’ success at mass transit’s expense was due to a simple 
struggle between proponents. Nor was it simply due to collusion and corporate greed on the part 
                                                 
34 Dick Pintarich, “The Rise and Fall of Oregon’s Electrics,” in Pintarich, Great and Minor 
Moments in Oregon History, New Oregon Publishers, 2003, pp. 190-202 
35 Cf. www.vintagetrolleys.com 
36 Cf. William Cornett, “Vaughn Street Park and the Great Baseball War of 1903,” Northwest 
Examiner, October 2009, pp. 22-3 
37 Tri-Met, “A history of public transit in Portland,” 
http://trimet.org/about/history/transitinportland.htm 
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of General Motors, Standard Oil, and Firestone Tires, a common and powerful myth. PSU’s 
Adler makes these points in the case of Los Angeles in an award-winning 1991 article, “The 
Transformation of the Pacific Electric Railway,” and elsewhere for other U.S. cities38.  
 
Big problems for first-generation rail mass transit were changing urban form and a worn-out 
private-business model. The case of L.A., which had the West’s most vaunted system and its 
biggest transit collapse, is instructive. There, multiple new “downtowns” wanted economic 
autonomy and their leaders competed for business. Most thought transit favored central L.A. and 
preferred a more networked system (i.e., buses and, eventually, freeways). Even earlier, though, 
streetcars were already yielding to cheaper buses, while some passenger transit owners wanted to 
get into the more profitable freight business. Everybody loved freeways, even downtown 
businessmen; they just wanted them radial rather than networked. 
 
Potent transit advocates fought into the ‘50s to revivify L.A. streetcar and interurban lines, then 
still in private hands and struggling. However, suburban pressure caused their best plans to be 
co-opted. First rail transit was to be included within rights of way for that newfangled thing, the 
freeway. Then those plans were jelling too slowly, so rail was relegated to subways, someday – 
nearly 40 years later, as it turned out.   
 
In L.A., dissent also blocked municipal acquisition of the failing private system until it was far 
too late. “It is regrettable,” wrote Stanford economist John Due in 1960, “that government units 
did not take over the [L.A. rail transit] system in the mid-thirties, when it was still intact ... and 
recognize the importance of continued use of the rail facilities in the over-all solution to the 
transportation problems in the area.”39 The issue would play out over 20 years in local and 
federal politics. 
 
Meanwhile, according to Bianco, in L.A. and in every other city, private transit companies 
became increasingly invested in buses, the only way to meet government’s requirement that they 
serve increasingly spread-out, unprofitable routes40. GM’s hidden subsidiaries did buy up and 
dismantle plenty of rail transit systems, substituting their own diesel buses – but the systems 
were already dying or dead from suburbanization and lack of civic intervention.  
 
Automobiles, and users’ love of the lifestyle they afforded (realtors loved it, too), facilitated 
suburbanization in the first place, even though “streetcar suburbs” had preceded them. As Bianco 
put it, “What if we have met the enemy, and the enemy is us?”41 Not GM, that is – drivers. 
 
                                                 
38 Sy Adler, “The Transformation of the Pacific Electric Railway: Bradford Snell, Roger Rabbit, 
and the Politics of Transportation in Los Angeles,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 27-1, Se 1991, pp. 
51-86; Cf. Sy Adler, “The Evolution of Federal Transit Policy,” in Martin A. and Martin V. 
Melosi, Urban Public Policy, Penn State, 1993, pp. 69-99   
39 Adler, “The Transformation of the Pacific Electric Railway,” p. 59 
40 Martha Bianco, “Kennedy, 60 Minutes, and Roger Rabbit: Understanding Conspiracy Theory 
Explanations of the Decline of Urban Mass Transit,” PSU Center for Urban Studies, Discussion 
Paper 98-11, November 1998 
41 Ibid. 
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In Portland and environs, electric rail started fading early, almost as soon as it got off the ground. 
In Bianco’s systematic assessment in her 1994 dissertation, by 1915 the electric lines were 
already in financial trouble due to service demands from city and state regulators, fare demands 
from riders, wage demands from employees, and competitive demands from other transit 
companies that had caused too-rapid expansion42 (to all those lovely termini). Later, as in L.A., 
car-love, suburbanization, place-based competition, freeway development and lack of 
government intervention would hasten the electrics’ end.  
 
Two other nationally occurring phenomena also were prominent in Portland transit’s troubles as 
early as the ‘20s. Traffic jams arose as the growing number of automobiles hampered on-street 
rail carriages entering the city center, and off-peak fares declined as automobiles became the 
leisure-mode of choice, with transit used mostly for commuting.  
 
The bottom line, for Bianco, was that Oregon’s early electric-rail industry “was a victim of the 
irreconcilable conflict between its profit motive and the service duty mandated by its franchises 
and expected by its constituencies.”43 
 
                                                 
42 Martha Bianco, “Private Profit Versus Public Service: Competing Demands in Urban 
Transportation History and Policy, Portland, Oregon, 1872-1970,” PhD dissertation, Portland 
State University, 1994, pp. 53-55, 251-261 
43 Bianco, “Private Profit Versus Public Service,” p. 55 
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7.0  THE INTERSTATES 
 
The Good Roads movement made long-distance automobile travel practical; the Interstate and 
Defense Highways program was its apotheosis. Modeled on the autobahnen started by Adolf 
Hitler in 1935, the U.S. interstate system was conceived by Thomas H. MacDonald, chief of the 
federal Bureau of Public Roads, and his top aide, Herbert S. Fairbank44. The two men 
shepherded their dream through 20 years of fits and starts to full funding in 1956. 
 
Federal highway money first began to flow after World War I when farmers wanting farm-to-
market roads and Rural Free Delivery joined the Good Roads movement. Advocacy from the 
American Automobile Association (AAA) and the American Association of State Highway 
Officials (AASHO) led to the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1916 authorizing $25 million for 
improvement of “rural post roads.” 
 
Said Warren Harding, on his way to a 1920 presidential landslide, “... one of the greatest 
economic problems, if not the greatest problem of modern civilization, is distribution. There can 
be no doubt of the position of the good roads movement in the solution of the problem.”45 
Federal aid grew. 
 
Franklin Roosevelt, unfortunately perhaps, knew that putting people back to work meant 
building roads. MacDonald’s plans were set in motion at the height of the Depression; federal 
gas taxation began in 1932 and the 1934 authorization bill told states to use 1.5% of their federal 
highway money for a comprehensive national survey of road conditions, use, and financing. The 
1938 report based on the survey’s findings, called Toll Roads and Free Roads, featured a 
“Master Plan for Free Highway Development” describing a toll-free network of express 
highways, grade-separated and with limited access, which would evolve into the interstate 
system. Based on the survey – and in consultation with the Department of War – MacDonald and 
Fairbank proposed the system’s initial 26,700 miles. 
 
The interstate system consisted of two distinct components: the “interregional” highways 
upgrading rural roads to link cities across hundreds of straight miles, and the urban highways 
intended to relieve the greatest problem identified in state surveys, namely urban congestion. 
Increasingly, busy intercity trucking routes entered cities along old highways that had become 
streets. These were hard to widen and had become a congested mess. The 1938 prescription was 
for completely separate, limited-access expressways that drilled into, under or over cities, 
forming elevated or sunken rings around downtowns and bigger rings serving suburbs. 
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On the other hand, one publication (just hearsay, as it was not located by the time this was 
written) is said to have argued that only with gas-tax revenue from urban freeways could the 
interstates have been built at all46. 
 
As much as congestion, the program aimed at the famous ill called “urban blight.” Downtowns, 
the report said, were “cramped, crowded, and depreciated”; beyond them lay the “slum area 
where living conditions are poor. Around the slums is an even larger area of residential property 
in various stages of depreciation. This is the widely discussed ‘blighted area.’ Without the 
application of effective rehabilitation measures, it will become part of the city's slums.”  
 
Ironically, the report accurately blamed the automobile for urban flight and for suburbs 
extending “far out beyond the city limits ... merging almost imperceptibly into the farm lands.” It 
made urban expressways the very centerpiece of a revitalizing new planning regime, which 
would have to “provide the greater space now needed for the unfettered circulation of traffic, and 
... permit a reintegration of facilities for the various forms of transportation – railway terminals, 
docks, airports and the highway approaches to each – more consistent with their modern 
relationships.”47 It recommended haste in buying rights of way – while land values in “blighted 
areas” were still low! 
 
But action had to wait for two foreign wars, election of a new and highway-obsessed soldier-
president, and many battles among states, regions, and urban and rural constituents for their fair 
share of federal money and attention. As in L.A., freeways were widely seen as a hot ticket. The 
mid-war 1944 Federal-Aid Highway Act freed $500 million precious dollars for planning; the 
postwar boom galvanized attention toward cities and jobs. After the Korean War, constituents 
were still arguing; a 1955 authorization bill failed. Finally, urban legislators got a glimpse of the 
goods they’d be getting, courtesy of a publication called the Yellow Book (later discarded). This 
swung enough votes to pass the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act, spending $32.9 billion for 90% 
of the cost of 41,000 miles of freeway, coast to coast, into and around every major city.   
 
Very much to their credit, MacDonald and Fairbank (both of whom retired before final passage) 
always believed that correcting urban ills (albeit through freeways) would involve coordination 
with city and perhaps new regional planning authorities. To their discredit, they scoffed at city 
planners’ growing concern that urban freeways would hasten suburbanization. In any case, no 
mandate for coordination was included in the final act, nor any incorporation of transit.  
 
According to Richard Weingroff – whose excellent histories pepper the Federal Highway 
Administration’s website – “[d]esignation of the urban networks in 1955 and 1957 foreclosed the 
type of planning that might have defused some of the urban controversies that would surround 
development of the Interstate Highway Program.”48  
 
In 1999, Robert Fishman of Rutgers University asked leading urban historians, planners, and 
architects what forces they thought had most shaped the modern American city; topping the list 
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were the 1956 Interstate Highway Act and the dominance of the automobile. “More than any 
other single measure, the 1956 act created the decentralized, automobile-dependent metropolis 
we know today,” Fishman wrote49. 
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8.0  OREGON’S INTERSTATES AND “GENERAL” GLENN 
JACKSON 
 
Oregon’s first whiff of the coming interstate era arrived in 1943 when Robert Moses was invited 
to study Portland and propose $60 million in public works projects,  create 20,000-30,000 jobs 
and handle a population newly swollen from the wartime ship- building industry50. Moses, since 
1918 one of the most powerful public works figures in New York, was known for his love of 
urban roads, disdain for transit, racist tendencies, and ability to channel and control vast sums of 
construction money through political tactics and patronage51.  
 
Moses and his team of engineers and lawyers suggested for Portland everything from parks and 
playgrounds to freight improvements. Their centerpiece – Moses’ specialty, having cut his teeth 
diverting money from Franklin Roosevelt’s Hudson Valley highway to build his own pet 
freeway network all over Long Island52 – was an arterial plan that included a central loop of 
freeway, which he called a “thruway.” The plan very much set the stage for what was ultimately 
built: it included a sunken west-side “thruway”; a new Willamette bridge north of the Broadway 
(“... near Fremont street ...”); a “thruway” north to the Interstate Bridge; a prescription for 
hundreds of acres of demolition, excavation, and cloverleaf, and links to major highways heading 
out of town in every direction. It differed in proposing a separate new bridge to Vancouver rather 
than adding to the first, as was ultimately done in the ‘50s; in expanding the Ross Island Bridge 
rather than building a new bridge (the Marquam); in routing the “Foothills Thruway” along 
Northwest 24th Avenue, around Nob Hill and through Goose Hollow, rather than along 14th and 
15th Avenues; and in locating the “Eastside Thruway” not along the Willamette waterfront but 
several blocks inland53. 
 
(Moses’ original report was scanned and posted to the Portland Mercury’s website in October 
2009 by DLCD transportation planner Bob Cortright, after a request from reporter Sarah Mirk in 
response to reader interest sparked by her article about Portland’s “dead freeways.”54 So it goes 
in Oregon.)  
 
Moses’ visit was undoubtedly a big deal for Portland. But his day would pass and he would 
eventually be discredited, even in New York, for his insensitive urban renewal55. 
 
At the state level, in 1956 the Oregon State Highway Department (OSHD) and Oregon State 
Highway Commission (OSHC) stood ready to administer the $650 million about to come their 
way. State departments headed by engineers and citizen commissions to dispense funds were a 
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legacy of the anti-corruption-minded Good Roads movement. They had, in fact, been required by 
the 1916 Highway Act for any state wanting to get federal money56. Oswald West’s original 
executive commission was thus reformed as a citizen commission in 1917.  
 
Through all the years leading up to the interstate era, Oregon’s highway department was 
considered top-notch; Robert H. “Sam” Baldock was state highway engineer from 1932 to 1956 
and served a term as national president of AASHO. Responding to the same congestion noted by 
the 1930s national survey, Baldock and the OSHD pushed even before the war for an eastern 
expressway. They had the Banfield built by 1955, thanks to $40 million in state bonds approved 
in 1952. US 30 through the Columbia Gorge, which would become I-84, had already undergone 
pre-war upgrades. State engineers also were working on a Portland-Salem Expressway, 26 miles 
of which had been completed by 1955 and which had only to be upgraded to interstate 
standards57.  
 
Basic route choices for Oregon’s 731 miles of non-urban interstate were obvious and made early, 
by the state, as prescribed in the 1944 Highway Act, although siting would follow. One north-
south and one east-west freeway would be designated I-5 and I-80N (later changed to I-84), 
respectively. With the state’s head start, over half of the key north-south route had been 
completed by 1961 and it was finished in October 1966. I-84 was finally finished in 1980. Siting 
was laborious for I-82, the freeway from Hermiston to Washington’s Tri-Cities that had been 
ordered up by the federal government in 1956 to connect to military facilities at Hanford. It was 
the final piece of Oregon’s freeway system when it was completed in 198858.   
 
Urban segments “designated” as part of the approved (and funded) 41,000 national miles were 
few but significant: I-105 from I-5 to downtown Eugene; I-205 through Oregon City, east 
Portland and Vancouver; I-305 from I-5 through north Salem to its downtown; I-405 to create 
Portland’s Moses-inspired central loop; and I-505 from I-405 through Portland’s Northwest 
industrial area to US 30 west toward Astoria. The Mt. Hood Freeway through Southeast Portland 
was not part of the original 41,000 miles but, as it was proposed by the city in 1965 to replace the 
Banfield as the linking segment of the interstate system, it did receive federal approval and 
funding59. Only the I-105, I-205 and I-405 were ever built, along with Highways 26  and 217 in 
Washington County, which were never interstate segments. 
 
Construction of Oregon’s interstates was far along when Glenn Jackson, a self-made millionaire 
from Medford, was appointed to the Oregon State Highway Commission in 1959; it was half 
done when Gov. Mark Hatfield made him chair in 1962. By pretty much all accounts, his tenure 
– lasting until 1979, the year before his death – flew in the face of the Good Roads progressives’ 
and the 1916 federal government’s directive that citizen commissions serve as bulwarks against 
patronage. Jackson, whom Gov. McCall nicknamed “The General,” seemed to craft his power in 
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Robert Moses’ mold. Brent Walth, in his 1994 biography of McCall, Fire at Eden’s Gate, had 
this to say: 
 
Jackson’s accomplishments as Highway Commission chair were dramatic. During his tenure the 
Highway Department spent more than a billion dollars to build [the] interstate freeways and more 
than eight hundred bridges .... Jackson never escaped questions of conflicts of interest. Many people 
close to Jackson saw the conflicts, but understood that his political influence guaranteed he would 
never be held accountable for them. ... [M]any of the fertile tales of his power remain secret, 
protected by his loyalists, even now60. 
 
Maybe so, but those who operated in his sphere tend to have stories and opinions. Recalled Mike 
Hollern, who served on Jackson’s commission from 1975 to 1979 and later served as chair:  
 
He never necessarily believed in the transportation commission [or the] original law setting it up. 
The commission’s primary responsibility was to create policy; under Glenn it never had been done. 
... Being on the commission with Glenn meant you weren’t too involved in decisions. ... The way 
he conducted business was: ‘Any objections? Approved.’ He was not a fan of public meeting laws; 
he would ‘recess’ the meeting and light his pipe. He used to have pre-meetings in the director’s 
office; if anyone from the press wanted to be there, they had to get past two secretaries61. 
 
Mike Burton, the former Metro chief and also a former state legislator, helped broker a deal to 
assuage Jackson after Gov. Bob Straub appointed a new OSHD director over his head. Burton 
said of Jackson, “[h]e never did anything out loud, only behind closed doors .... You don’t need 
to yell very loud if you’re controlling the system.”62  
 
In the case of the interstates, that control meant authority for siting without much concern for 
environmental impacts and with little place for public pushback. “Nobody could have contested 
the freeway location in Yoncalla or Drain,” observed retired transportation planner Craig 
Greenleaf63. Or, as Bill Blosser, former LCDC chair, DLCD director and TPR co-author put it, 
“Jackson just ran I-5 and I-405 right through the middle of everything.”64 
 
However, Jackson’s OSHC chairmanship, and the development of Oregon’s interstates, began in 
one era and ended in another – with a revolution in between.  
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9.0  1950S WORRIES & THE DAWN OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 
 
When did the American environmental movement begin? Some say with John Muir and Teddy 
Roosevelt, at the turn of the last century. Others say it was with foundation of the Wilderness 
Society in 1935, publication of Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac in 194965, or David 
Brower’s ascension to the Sierra Club presidency in 1952. Consensus, however, would peg it to 
the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring, which became a bestseller and 
quickly altered domestic public discourse66. The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, 
inaugurating 12 years of Democratic administrations following eight years of Dwight 
Eisenhower, did not hurt. 
 
Much Oregon discourse in the 1950s, in step with Moses’ visit, was about growth; the state’s 
population increased by 40% during the decade, and the postwar boom  cranked up the economy 
here as everywhere. Portland, like many cities, planned urban renewal projects to demolish old, 
ethnic, downtown neighborhoods in favor of new, modern ones. Out of step then, to differing 
degrees, were two journalists-turned-politicians whose personalities were dominant and whose 
hearts – also to differing degrees – were with the land.   
 
During the six years from Richard Neuberger’s election to the U.S. Senate in 1954 until his death 
in 1960, he fought high-profile battles, usually involving hydroelectric dams. Historian William 
Robbins, in his 2004 book Landscapes of Conflict, called Neuberger “an old-style New-Dealer 
who believed in planning when it was becoming less fashionable ... [but] an ambivalent mix, 
believing in developing and protecting nature, supporting large public-works projects, and 
setting aside public lands ....”67 He loved Hells Canyon on the Snake River and the Deschutes 
gorge and he fought dams in both places, but it was mostly because they were not homegrown 
public power projects. 
 
Neuberger’s greater significance, though, was captured by fellow newspaperman Steve Forrester 
in a 1984 article:  
 
By demonstrating that a highly articulate candidate with very liberal ideas could find acceptance 
with the Oregon electorate, Neuberger shifted the center of Oregon politics. ... Mark Hatfield, one-
time Senator and Governor ... [reflected] that “... the Oregon Democratic party seized the liberal 
perspective, overturning the conservative tradition within its own party. That gave progressives in 
the Republican party more competition, which turned state politics, Republican and Democratic, 
more toward the liberal side.”68 
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McCall was just such a progressive Republican. Throughout the ‘50s, paper-industry waste being 
dumped into the Willamette River was a growing concern for legislators, yet they proved 
impotent to stop it. McCall made his name with a hard-hitting 1962 documentary about the 
problem, Pollution in Paradise. According to Walth, his biographer, “[t]he legislature responded 
with a bill ... that, for the first time, gave the state the power to shut down a polluting company. 
... [This] signaled a change in Oregon politics. For the next twenty years, politicians gave 
environmental concerns high priority ....” As for McCall, the experience “... was an awakening. 
What did he offer Oregon that no one else could? He could suddenly answer that now. He could 
fight for the state itself, its water and air and land.”69  
 
Another thread of conservationist thought and worried action also grew in the ‘50s in direct 
response to growth. Along the same urban fringe mentioned by MacDonald and Fairbank, not 
shining suburbs but haphazard rural-residential real estate development was springing up 
overnight to meet the boom. Astoundingly, there was vocal concern in the Portland area over 
automobile-driven suburbanization as early as the ‘20s, according to Carl Abbott. Depression 
stalled it, but the war boom brought it back. In 1944, the League of Oregon Cities (LOC) 
resolved that “sporadic, scattered, and unregulated growth of municipalities and urban fringes 
has caused tremendous waste in money and resources.”70 
 
In 1947, the Legislature gave counties the authority to appoint planning commissions with the 
power to zone, but few responded. The following year, the postwar Readjustment and 
Development Commission reported an exurban “no-man’s land where city ordinances do not 
apply and county courts have no jurisdiction.”71 Recreational developments emerged along the 
coast and in central Oregon.  
 
In 1951, state Agriculture Director E.L. Peterson asked whether “a people [could] multiply and 
develop in an area rich in natural resources without themselves destroying the resources and 
natural beauty ....”72 The 1955 Legislature commissioned a statewide study of urban fringes, 
which revealed the scope of public services problems that existed there73; but in the next 10 
years, 20% of Willamette Valley farmland, most of it at cities’ fringes but some in farther flung 
rural subdivisions, was developed74.  
 
McCall’s election in 1966 finally galvanized action, first a 1967 conference called “The 
Willamette Valley: What Is Our Future in Land Use,” then a legislative interim committee that 
helped draft Senate Bill 10 directing (not asking) counties to develop land use plans. The law 
passed in 1969, but eventual land use champion L.B. Day negotiated away companion Senate 
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bills 11, 12, and 13 in the process75. What was left proved weak, bringing only laggardly 
response from counties (and a failed repeal effort). McCall, promising to strengthen it, won re-
election in 1970. Finally, in 1973, McCall and key legislators succeeded in passing SB 100, 
which had considerably greater teeth. 
 
The whole enterprise, the entire era in fact, evolved along with the interstates. Charbonneau, a 
477-acre development built by the Benjamin Franklin Savings and Loan next to an I-5 
interchange and 15 miles from the nearest suburb, Wilsonville76, helped tip the scales in SB 
100’s favor. Admittedly, the intensive developments that sparse freeway interchanges 
immediately spawned when the interstates were built – their biggest unintended consequence, 
added to the intended consequence of suburbanization – were only a trade-out for the continuous 
commercial development that had characterized non-limited-access highways. 
 
But drawing on the new national environmental and local land-use consciousness, as well as on a 
broader political awakening that resulted from the civil rights, women’s rights and anti-war 
movements, a special strain of activism – neighborhood-based anti-freeway activism – was 
evolving. And with it, downtown activism also evolved, business- and housing-focused but 
responding to suburbanization in the same way that anti-freeway activism responded to 
suburbanization’s major cause. 
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10.0  FEDERAL URBAN AND TRANSIT POLICY IN THE 1960S 
 
A funny thing happened on the way to UMTA. In the eight years between the Interstate Act of 
1956 and the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964, freeways were being built, loved by suburban 
leaders who knew they’d deliver commerce, but equally loved by downtown leaders who also 
believed they’d deliver commerce and relieve congestion, even while the freeways were helping 
drain their downtowns of life.   
 
According to Adler, in a 2004 chapter entitled “The Evolution of Federal Transit Policy,” 
national mass transit advocates included at the time of transit’s looming demise in the ‘50s not 
only those who thought rails were smart, but those whose jobs depended on them. The American 
Transit Association (ATA, which became the American Public Transit Association, APTA) 
represented private operators, by then largely bus companies, but also channeled the voices of 
manufacturers and construction workers. Roads may have meant jobs, but so did transit.       
 
Downtown business leaders, Adler wrote, wanting even more advantage than they thought 
freeways offered, started trying “... to create regionwide governmental transit agencies that 
would invest in the types of services and facilities that would enhance the accessibility and 
reception capacity of the core.”77 Suburban leaders successfully blocked many such efforts; that 
is, until the transit lobby got cagey. ATA leaders encouraged members to seek common cause 
with downtown merchants, and first succeeded in compelling the creation of no-parking-
downtown days, bus-only lanes, and park-and-ride lots. 
 
Then together, downtown and transit activists succeeded in creating regional transit agencies 
such as the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (LAMTA) in 1951 and the Bay Area 
Rapid Transit District (BARTD) in 1957. 
 
In a way, their efforts were co-opted and overwhelmed, but at the same time supercharged by a 
huge political shift. The problems of “urban blight,” noted before the war by the freeway 
advocates, by the 1950s were no longer just a planning problem but a growing human problem; 
downtowns became a federal, political concern. Beginning in the Republican Eisenhower 
administration78 but mostly following the election of Democrat Kennedy, center-city issues 
became a huge national focus. And transit champions, led by Congressman Harrison Williams of 
New Jersey and supported by downtown business and urban revitalization forces, argued 
successfully that transit planning – and money – were a key component to saving cities79. 
 
The results were the 1961 Housing Act, the first federal legislation to deal with urban mass 
transportation (it offered low-interest loans for service enhancements); then provisions in the 
1962 Federal Aid Highway Act mandating urban transportation planning and introducing the 
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“3C” process (Continuing, Comprehensive, Cooperative); and finally 1964’s Urban Mass Transit 
Act, appropriating $375 million in matching funds for transit projects. 
 
Williams’ agenda giving transit pride of place in solving urban social ills could not hold. In 
1966, the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) was moved from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to the newly created Department of Transportation, where it 
became increasingly subject to “rationalization” and “economism,” in Adler’s analysis80 (i.e., to 
expectations that it demonstrate the benefits relative to the costs of growing transit subsidies). In 
subsequent years, particularly under the Republican Nixon and Reagan administrations, transit 
became a political battlefield, even winning a 1986 “Golden Fleece” award from Senator 
William Proxmire.   
 
But in fits and starts, UMTA began to revitalize mass transit for those urban areas in a position to 
take advantage. Considering this history, it is not surprising that when anti-freeway activism 
arose in Portland, it became inextricably bound up with resurgent downtown and mass transit 
advocacy.   
 
According to Adler, it was an irony that the federal government wanted transportation policy to 
alter urban form at the same time that local transportation planners were concluding it was too 
late81. This is the point at which Portland diverged permanently from the mainstream, starting – 
or not ceasing – to believe that transportation policy, at least when combined with Oregon’s 
other barrier-smasher, land-use planning, could alter, or at least shape, urban form. Of course 
Portland still had less area already devoted to decentralized suburbs than most cities, but that was 
dumb provincial luck.   
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11.0  RCT, MPC, CRAG, PVMTS, TRI-MET, MSD, METRO, 
JPACT! 
 
Nationwide, transit ridership dipped 26% between 1946 and 1950, and another 28% by 1954; in 
Portland, the abysmal figures were 41% and 34%, with a further 40% drop to come by 1963. By 
the early ‘50s, Portland’s city buses and failing interurbans had ended up in the ownership of a 
San Francisco company called Portland Transit; neither locals nor city officials liked or trusted 
them much. As early as 1952 there was talk of public transit ownership82. 
 
In 1956, Portland Transit calved off a new and separate company called Rose City Transit 
(RCT), hoping to get their buses onto suburban lines and convert the interurban rail lines to 
freight. RCT buried some hatchets with the city council, in line with ATA’s agenda. However, 
the council and new Mayor Terry Schrunk, elected in 1957, were reluctant to extend RCT’s 
franchise. Schrunk and others increasingly believed public ownership was the only way to ensure 
service. But municipal ownership, put to the voters in 1958 and 1962, failed both times. In 1963, 
RCT’s franchise was extended for 10 years. 
 
Meanwhile, nationally, MacDonald’s and Fairbank’s constructive (if freeway-inspired) wish for 
integration of metropolitan regional and transportation planning was coming full circle. Section 
701 of the Eisenhower-era Housing Act of 1954 made a start toward funding comprehensive 
planning aimed at solving urban social problems, initially authorizing $1 million per year in 
grants to city and state planning agencies for unified metro-area plans83. 
 
According to Abbott, interest in consolidating Portland and Multnomah County government 
dated back to the 1920s, and thought for creating full metro-area governance went at least back 
to the 1944 LOC report. The 1956 Legislature asked for a study of “metropolitan government,” 
and in 1957 this resulted in creation of the Portland area’s first truly regional body, the 
Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC)84. The MPC included representatives from the three 
metropolitan Oregon counties and Clark County in Washington state.  
 
By 1961, due to competition among jurisdictions and an unchecked explosion of special districts, 
the MPC was in crisis. Rising to the occasion, Abbott says, was “a new generation of leaders 
comparable to the business and professional men who had initiated Portland-area planning by 
bringing John Olmsted and Edward Bennett to Portland a half-century earlier.”85 Out in front 
was the League of Women Voters. Responding to local insistence that 218 urban-area special 
districts were far too many, the 1963 Legislature created the Portland Metropolitan Study 
Commission to sort them out.  
 
                                                 
82 Bianco dissertation, p. 536 
83 Weiner, Urban Transportation Planning in the United States, p. 24 
84 Abbott and Abbott, “A History of Metro, May 1991” 
85 Ibid. 
 42
The MPC had been authorized to receive the Section 701 planning grants from the 1954 Housing 
Act; now the grantor, the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), wanted better 
small-city representation86. So did the cities, according to Abbott; they had “long felt that the 
four-member board of the Metropolitan Planning Commission gave a cold shoulder to their 
interests.” At the study commission’s recommendation, the MPC was replaced in 1966 by the 
Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG), with representatives from each metro-
area city and county.  
 
As it happened, that year the new Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
successor to HHFA, required that to receive federal funds each metro area must establish a 
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), representing jurisdictions with at least 90% of the 
urban-area population. CRAG, happily, fit the bill. “With threat of federal cutoff of planning and 
infrastructure dollars, even a reluctant Washington County signed on in October, 1966,” Abbott 
wrote. 
 
Metro-area transportation planning evolved with governance structure. After Moses’ visit, on 
through the 1956 Highway Act and until creation of the MPC, regional coordination was limited. 
In 1959, the year Glenn Jackson joined the Oregon State Highway Commission (OSHC), the 
commission initiated the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan Transportation Study (PVMTS). Its 
mission, according to Abbott ...  
 
... to do area-wide highway planning in compliance with federal government requirements. PVMTS 
brought together the three counties, Portland, a dozen other cities, the Port of Portland, and the 
MPC. Clark County and the state of Washington were informal participants. Decisions were made 
by a Coordinating Committee with the advice of a Technical Advisory Committee. PVMTS 
employed its own staff early on, but came to rely on consultants and state highway employees87. 
 
PVMTS preceded by three years the 1962 Highway Act’s mandate for urban transportation 
planning. It was later observed that the Act, with its “3C” requirement for Continuing, 
Comprehensive planning done Cooperatively by states and local communities, was “the first 
recognition that there was a role, albeit ill-defined, for public transportation to play in urban 
areas.”88 But PVMTS, organized with Jackson’s OSHC and engineers of the OSHD at its helm, 
was all about freeways – with hundreds of millions in available federal aid as strong incentive. 
By 1966 the PVMTS had produced the ambitious, and later infamous, Transportation Plan 1990, 
and succeeded in getting it adopted by the city of Portland and other local governments. The plan 
included, in addition to the “committed” Mt. Hood Freeway, “freeway-expressway” routes 
extending the Mt. Hood to Gresham; from St. Johns to Fairview, Beaverton to Milwaukie, and 
Lake Oswego to Gladstone; north and west from Beaverton to a soon-to-be-infamous Westside 
Bypass; and along 39th Avenue and Killingsworth Street in residential east Portland. The 
PVMATS plan would be dismantled in the early 1970s, thanks to the Governor’s Task Force on 
Transportation. 
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Bianco’s extremely well-researched 1994 dissertation paints a picture of the City of Portland’s 
embattled ‘50s- and ‘60s-era downtown transportation planning. Her picture opens with an 
“obituary”: “Downtown Business District of City X, last surviving member of a family of City 
Downtown Business Districts, died yesterday in the City of X, a one-time prominent member of 
the community” – this from a 1952 Portland city planning commission document, “Bus 
Transportation in Downtown Portland.”89 
 
Mass transit, second in attention to freeways and long just left to private companies, began 
getting attention – including, as mentioned, thoughts about taking it public. Partly due to 
merchants’ fears (the “obituary’s” main diagnosis was congestion) and partly due to planners’ 
reaction to freeways, as early as 1960 there were plans on the books in Portland for bus-only 
lanes, downtown-fringe parking, and later, underground busways. However, these were designed 
to mesh with downtown advocates’ generally preferred alignment for Moses’ “Foothills 
Thruway,” by then called I-405 or the Stadium Freeway. They wanted it to travel up Market and 
Clay streets – a horrifying prospect today, even while we accept the I-405 gash as part of the 
landscape. 
 
Although their plan was about done, in 1965 the Oregon members of PVMTS agreed to 
implement “3C” planning and in 1966 they commissioned a Portland-Vancouver Mass Transit 
Use Study. But their main vision, echoing L.A.’s, was for express busways in freeway rights of 
way. When their duties were taken over by CRAG in 1967, attention to mass transit remained 
halfhearted90. 
 
On October 14, 1969, after almost a year of ongoing fare and wage disputes and much wrangling 
over how exactly to go about creating public ownership, the Tri-County Metropolitan 
Transportation District of Oregon (TriMet) was born. After two failed voter referrals, in the end 
the mechanism chosen was state legislation. HB 1808 allowed populous local jurisdictions 
simply to declare transit districts without county ratification or popular vote. Tri-Met received 
80% of the money it needed to purchase RCT’s assets from UMTA91. 
 
Abbott puts the creation of Tri-Met in the context of broader changes occurring locally and 
statewide under McCall: 
 
The climax of the PMSC's work came in 1969–70 as part of a burst of concern for planning and 
environmental protection throughout the state of Oregon. In Salem, mounting concern about 
maintaining the quality of Oregon's environment brought the state bottle recycling bill, legislation 
reaffirming the public ownership of Pacific beaches, and planning for a Willamette Greenway. The 
state's Sanitary Authority changed into a more ambitious Department of Environmental Quality in 
1969 ... the same year [as] Senate Bill 10 .... The same years also gave Portland ... [Tri-Met], 
consolidation of the Portland Commission of Public Docks with the Port of Portland (1970), 
establishment of a Unified Sewerage Agency for Washington County (1970), creation of the 
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Portland Metropolitan Area Local Government Boundary Commission (1969), and establishment of 
the Metropolitan Service District (1970). ... The Boundary Commission and the Metropolitan 
Service District ... set the terms for the evolution of regional planning and services in the 1970s92. 
  
Abbott called MSD “a governmental ‘box’ which could hold as many service responsibilities as 
voters or the legislature were willing to assign.” The first was solid waste; later came the 
Washington Park Zoo. Early on, Tri-Met was considered for inclusion under MSD, but Portland 
objected and it did not occur. 
 
Throughout the 1970s, CRAG fulfilled planning and transportation planning functions to the 
extent that it could. However, as a fledgling regional planning organization, CRAG was 
hampered by imperfect authority, unstable funding, too-extensive membership, and struggles as 
members began the effort of trying to work collaboratively93. The state helped out in 1973 by 
making membership mandatory, but the following year, responding to new statewide planning 
rules, CRAG was seen to overstep with its “Columbia-Willamette Region Comprehensive Plan: 
Discussion Draft,” perceived as a “grand regional scheme cooked up by CRAG bureaucrats.”94 It 
was distracted by unsuccessful attempts at city-county consolidation, and in 1976 CRAG 
survived a statewide ballot measure to abolish all councils of government. 
 
The final act in the long progression to regional government would not come until the formation 
of Metro in 1979, eliminating CRAG and MSD and combining their functions. At that time, in 
order to continue meeting federal requirements for regional planning organizations receiving 
transportation funding, Metro created the Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation, or 
JPACT. But even before and during the CRAG years, as those who participated still recollect, 
the evolving ability to work together toward regional consensus about transportation issues – 
with a lot of money at stake – was a shining light95. 
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12.0  THE ERNIE BONNER INTERVIEWS 
 
In the realm of writing about planning and civic affairs, somewhere between history as 
scholarship and history with attitude, lies history that flows straight from the mouths of those 
who made it. The Terkelesque progressions in such recountings are sometimes those of 
storytelling, sometimes computer-brained individuals’ magic memories. 
 
Such are transcribed texts from 27 interviews conducted between about 1995 and 2003 by former 
Portland city planner Ernie Bonner, posted on the website of Portland State University’s School 
of Urban and Public Affairs96 (almost twice as many more await transcription). 
 
Bonner, who died in 2004, captured the voices of those who created the transformations Abbott 
roadmaps above – of Portland from the world of PVMTS to that of Metro and MAX; of Oregon 
from the realm of Robert Moses and Glenn Jackson to that of Tom McCall and Neil 
Goldschmidt.     
 
Bits and pieces from Bonner’s interviews will appear for years in Oregon planning histories, and 
they will serve as inspirational models for future Bonners and local Terkels. Giving the texts 
room to breathe in shorthand history is not very practical, but a not-very-edited sampling to 
introduce them injects the transformers’ voices and provides background music for the chapters 
to follow:    
 
[Rick Gustafson, former Tri-Met transportation planner and state legislator, and the first Metro 
chief – recorded February 2003]  
 
Actually, the first council of governments formed in the United States was formed in Salem [under] 
Kent Matheson, City Manager ....  [T]he governor who got Eisenhower to form it was Mark 
Hatfield. Anyway, so these guys [in Portland] put the Columbia Regional Association of 
Governments together, and in 1967 the Port was made a three-county organization, and so the 
regionalization was starting. There was an election or legislation in '67 to create a metro-city or 
something like that, and Roger Martin, representing Lake Oswego, made the mistake of supporting 
this thing ... 
 
EB: And they killed him? 
 
RG: Well, he didn't lose, but it was a big mistake on his part because there was complete opposition 
in Lake Oswego to becoming part of Portland, but there was some sort of redoing of the boundaries 
to regionalize, and as a result of those kinds of initiatives to deal with the regional issues, they 
proposed forming a Metropolitan Service District as a compromise, bringing the three counties into 
a regional service district, and the idea was that they'd use this and have county commissioners and 
the city mayor and all that kind of stuff on the board, and they would regionalize that way. It was 
going along fine, but some people decided they needed to have a vote to form it, and they needed a 
vote to fund it. This was in '69, and then Rose City announces that it's going bankrupt, and the 
transit union goes down to the legislature, and they work up this temporary legislation to save the 
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transit union and Rose City, and they form the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District, but 
it was really in conflict with the Metropolitan Service District, and so it was Connie McCready, 
who was a legislator at the time, who basically struck the compromise to allow this temporary 
organization to be created, Tri-Met, and have a provision that if MSD was formed by the voters that 
MSD would then assume responsibility for Tri-Met. So that's how they put that provision in, and so 
the two things were formed, and MSD then was put on the ballot and it was passed in May, but then 
the tax base failed in November. So it was formed, but it had actually no money.  
.... 
 
[Earl Blumenauer, Third District congressman and former state legislator – February 2001] 
 
[In 1972] I was first elected to the legislature. There was a big realignment of political activity in 
Portland at that time. I had worked on campaigns for Tom Walsh and Neil Goldschmidt for City 
Council in 1970. When Neil was elected to City Hall, one of his executive assistants, Ron Buel, 
came to me one day in 1971 and said, “You ought to run for the legislature.” It was a heady time .... 
[D]uring the 1970s, Portlanders and Oregonians were further ahead of our time, I think, than we 
recognized ....  
 
In the State and Federal Affairs committee we worked on the legislation for Senate Bill 100. I was 
able to guide my first major piece of legislation through that Committee: House Bill 3166, which 
created Oregon's Transportation Commission. It abolished the Highway Commission (something 
people thought would never happen) and created a State Transportation Commission [with] the 
challenge to create a statewide comprehensive multi-modal transportation plan. Now, it took ODOT 
almost two decades to do it, but it was an important mission and an important statement. My bill 
mandated that Glenn Jackson be the Chair of the new Commission. I worked very closely with him 
on the bill, and he was very interested in the broader scope of things. He was a critical ally of Neil 
Goldschmidt as Mayor, of Tom McCall as Governor, and subsequently, of Bob Straub, who I don't 
think really got the recognition he deserved as a critical player in all of this. 
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13.0  DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION AND HARBOR DRIVE 
 
Arnold Cogan, who would go on to be the first director of the state Department of Land 
Conservation and Development, recollected in a Bonner interview being hired in 1959 by City of 
Portland Planning Director Lloyd Keefe. “I had a drafting board right next to a guy named Bob 
Frasca. And Bob and I worked on a project called Pioneer Courthouse Square – only then we 
called it the Meier & Frank parking lot. ... And we worked on the idea – the revolutionary idea – 
of tearing all that parking down and building an open space in downtown Portland. People 
thought the idea was somewhere between heresy and communism.”97 
 
Portland city planners had been active all along; from the bus-lane days and on into the ‘60s they 
kept an eye toward professional city and regional planning trends. According to Bob Baldwin, a 
Multnomah County planner tapped to head up development of Portland’s Downtown Plan in 
1969, downtown plans had been tried twice before then without success98. The growth of 
suburban retail centers and then, in 1960, the opening of the Lloyd Center mall in east Portland, 
had downtown merchants frightened. They wanted freeways, they wanted transit, and now they 
mostly wanted parking. By 1968, the block diagonally across from the Meier & Frank 
department store held an unattractive two-story parking lot, and a Tacoma firm was proposing to 
build a 13-story parking garage99. Newly tuned-in citizens protested – loudly100.  
 
Shared concern from city council members, especially Lloyd Anderson, led directly to a city 
partnership with the engineering firm CH2M to try once more to develop a downtown plan. As 
the plan evolved toward completion, which would come in 1972, both Cogan and Frasca’s 
“Pioneer Square” idea and the ‘50s planners’ bus lanes would be included. So would mandatory 
street-level retail, downtown-edge parking facilities, and a full-on transit mall.  
 
Crucial to the plan, in fact preceding it, was concern over the way to connect the downtown area 
with the Willamette River waterfront. Since 1942, the year of Moses’ visit, an expressway called 
Harbor Drive had extended the entire length of the riverfront seawall. Soon after taking office in 
1967, Governor McCall, who felt connected to the river due to his documentary, Pollution in 
Paradise, said he wanted Harbor Drive removed101. Cogan remembered with horror fresh city 
plans at the time to create a whole series of off-ramp overpasses from Harbor Drive into 
downtown. As the governor’s chief planner, it was Cogan who got to deliver the news of 
McCall’s intentions to Mayor Schrunk, Commissioner Frank Ivancie and Planning Director 
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Keefe. “Their mouths just absolutely dropped. I mean, they were totally stunned,” Cogan 
remembered102.  
 
In response to the city’s plans, a group called Riverfront for People formed and began to apply 
its own pressure to remove Harbor Drive103. Despite the group’s efforts, media attention and 
even McCall’s expressed preference, both city and state engineers thought closing Harbor Drive 
would “back cars clear up to Lake Oswego.”104 A state task force echoed their conclusion; plans 
not to remove but to widen Harbor Drive proceeded.  
 
Since the expressway was a state highway, the man McCall ultimately had to persuade to remove 
it was none other than OSHC chair Glenn Jackson. Of all people, Jackson, who had formed an 
alliance with McCall105, was willing to consider it. According to Dick Ivey, who spearheaded the 
Downtown Plan partnership for CH2M, “Glenn Jackson liked Harbor Drive. He was basically 
closing it for his boss. That's exactly what he said to me. He threw up his hands and he said, ‘I'm 
just trying to help the Governor.’ That's exactly what he was doing. And he did. Because he 
could pretty much do anything he wanted to ....”106  
 
Once traffic-flow concerns were solved to Jackson’s satisfaction by Ivey and OSHD director 
Fred Klaboe (improving Front Avenue and creating access from I-405 to the Northwest 
industrial district for trucks previously using Harbor Drive), it was a done deal. The final 
decision to remove Harbor Drive was made in 1970; when it was torn out in 1974, there “wasn’t 
a ripple.”107 The decision was the first stemming of the automobile tide in Oregon. And the 
experience was also a major step in what Greg Baldwin (a transportation planner and son of 
Klaboe’s successor, George Baldwin, no relation to Bob Baldwin) would later refer to as “Glenn 
Jackson’s conversion.”108  
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14.0  NEIL GOLDSCHMIDT, THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, 
AND THE MT. HOOD FREEWAY 
 
On Harbor Drive’s heels, the combination of new environmental politics, new urban thinking 
(and funding), and a generational changing of the guard played out in Portland between 1973 and 
1977 as a mighty collision of interests and circumstances. If it were an opera – it was certainly 
grand enough – it would be called by the name of its second act, The Mt. Hood Freeway 
Withdrawal; but this would be preceded by Act I: The Governor’s Task Force, and followed by 
Act III: The Light Rail Decision, and Act IV: What To Do With All That Highway Money. 
 
The central drama first deserves mention for its contemporary resonance. Perhaps no event in 
Oregon planning history has captured the public imagination in quite the same way that the 1974 
decision not to build the Mt. Hood Freeway (to “withdraw” it from the interstate system’s 41,000 
approved miles) has managed to do, at least in the modern era. Creation of the land use planning 
system in 1973 is an event better known, famously or infamously, statewide. As the campaigns 
for and against land use Measures 7, 37, and 49 came and went in the 2000s, citizens were 
repeatedly reminded of SB 100, the LCDC, and Governor McCall. 
 
But as Portland has evolved over the last decade into a growing Mecca – for youth, art, design, 
money, bicycles, ZipCars, transit, greenness, and the S-word, Sustainability – the Mt. Hood 
Freeway has taken on a freshly iconic role. It deserves it, and to an extent has maintained it 
continuously for 35 years, since the Mt. Hood’s demise is seen as the defining moment for an 
activist subculture that surfaces when the fights get big, as they did with an Eastside Freeway 
uprising in the 1980s and the Westside Bypass defeat in the 1990s, and as they are doing again 
today with the Columbia River Crossing (CRC). 
 
But there is something more. “Say,” said Ron Buel, who fought the Mt. Hood Freeway and is 
still active today against the CRC, “I just read a Lewis and Clark College undergraduate thesis; 
it’s pretty good.”109 The author was Katelyn Hale and the title is, “Hyperroads and Ghost Ramps: 
Shifting Urban Priorities and the Death of the Mt. Hood Freeway.”110 One of Hale’s sources was 
Shawn Granton, a “DIY historian” in Hale’s words, knowledgeable about the Mt. Hood. Granton 
operates “Dead Freeways” bike tours, a fact mentioned in the Sarah Mirk article, “The Dead 
Freeway Society,”111 that prompted Mercury readers to request copies of Robert Moses’ report. 
Also mentioned in Mirk’s article is Val Ballestrem of Portland’s Architectural Heritage Center 
(and an author for PSU’s Oregon Encyclopedia), who a couple of years ago wrote his own 
master’s thesis on the Mt. Hood Freeway. Ballestrem is in turn acknowledged in Eliot Fackler’s 
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2009 University of Oregon history thesis, “Protesting Portland’s Freeways: Highway 
Engineering and Citizen Activism in the Interstate Era.”112  
 
The Mt. Hood Freeway has wormed its way far into a new generation’s culture, including even 
urban popular culture. Advocates of SB 100 and statewide planning would kill to have their 
legacy and mythology bear the same cachet among the young. As it is, the statewide program 
does not quite have such cachet, and this continually puts it at risk. (1000 Friends of Oregon 
recognizes this; in October 2009, Friends sent out an invitation for nominations of “35 
innovators under 35.”113) 
 
The Mt. Hood Freeway’s operatic story really begins back in 1960, before Silent Spring, when 
another book started its own revolution: Jane Jacobs’ The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities, a critique of 1950s urban renewal policies114. As it happened, Jacobs was Robert Moses’ 
most ardent opponent in his drive to dig an I-405-style freeway called the Lower Manhattan 
Expressway across their New York City borough. She and fellow activists were successful in 
stopping the project, a last nail in the coffin of Moses’ reputation115. Jacobs’ book was eventually 
followed by others, including A. Q. Mowbray’s 1969 Road to Ruin, a sharp critique of the 
interstate system116; then in 1971, Helen Leavitt’s Superhighway, Superhoax, in a similar vein117, 
and Rites of Way by Alan Lupo, about the successful neighborhood revolt against Boston’s Inner 
Harbor freeway118; and then by Buel’s Dead End in 1972. 
 
James Dunn, in his 1998 book The Automobile, Its Enemies, and the Politics of Mobility, traces 
the rise of “The Vanguard,” his name for the national anti-automobile movement for which 
Jacobs served as one inspiration119. The movement reached Portland in time to remove Harbor 
Drive and stop the Mt. Hood Freeway – but not in time to have any influence over construction 
of the Stadium Freeway (I-405), or the segment of I-5 from downtown Portland to Vancouver, 
WA, which included the Marquam Bridge, the Eastside Freeway, and the “Minnesota” Freeway, 
excavated as an I-405-style trench through North Portland neighborhoods (along Minnesota 
Avenue). Neighborhood opposition to the Stadium and the Minnesota freeways, which did 
surface in the early ‘60s120, was dismissed. During its design and for years after construction, the 
Marquam was considered an inappropriate, ugly behemoth, too big by half and far too high. 
 
Topping the list of PVMTS’ remaining priorities were the freeways approved to receive 90% 
federal funding under the 1956 Interstate Act. These included the I-405, begun in 1967; the I-205 
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through east Portland, begun in 1968; and the I-505 through the Northwest Portland industrial 
area, which received federal approval in 1968 but was never built. Portland’s other major 
freeway, the Banfield, was completed before 1956 funding was available. The City, instead of 
using interstate funds to improve it, in 1965 advanced the idea of getting even more federal 
dollars to build a brand new freeway along a key PVMTS alignment, out Southeast Powell 
Boulevard to the I-205, and making this the official downtown interstate link. Between 1965 and 
1968, as PVMTS’ “Transportation Plan 1990” advanced, the proposal was touted by the City of 
Portland, CRAG, Multnomah County, and the State of Oregon. In 1969 it finally received their 
approval, that of the feds, and funding to the tune of $155 million121. It was called the Mt. Hood 
Freeway. It has been said that many in far Southeast Portland envisioned it as a “parkway to the 
hills,” and by 1969 right-of-way purchase had commenced. 
 
For those who wanted the Mt. Hood built, the timing was awful. Neil Goldschmidt, elected city 
commissioner in 1970, did not come to politics as an anti-freeway, pro-transit activist, but he did 
believe in the power of neighborhoods and recognized them as his best chance for election as 
mayor. While canvassing, he sensed the depth of anti-freeway sentiment and ran successfully in 
1972 on an anti-freeway platform, with neighborhood power trumping the business interests that 
unanimously opposed him122. 
 
What to do about PVMTS? The 1990 Plan was the region’s official transportation plan and its 
passport to federal dollars. Goldschmidt persuaded McCall to figure out a way to topple the plan, 
only just adopted in 1971 after 12 years of work. The coup would require both a political egg-
beater and sound and defensible rethinking of what sorts of transportation might really work for 
the urban region. The solution was put into play in May 1973, when McCall announced his 
Governor’s Task Force on Transportation, officially a subset of CRAG. Its 11 members included 
Goldschmidt, City Commissioner Mildred Schwab, County Commissioners Mel Gordon and 
James Gleason, and one representative each from the four counties and CRAG. It also included 
Glenn Jackson and his personal lawyer, Gerard Drummond, who happened to be a friend and 
campaign leader of Goldschmidt’s and would soon join the Tri-Met board123.  
 
The task force has, in one sense, been given more ink in subsequent years than its influence 
warranted. The big action was in Acts II and III, with neighborhood activism and decisions on 
light rail. But the task force did accomplish several important things. It immediately hired as 
consultants System Design Concepts (SyDec) of Maryland, whose principals had been involved 
with the nation’s first interstate withdrawal, that of the Inner Harbor freeway in Boston124. 
Together the task force and SyDec systematically dismantled all of the outdated assumptions on 
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which PVMTS was based, most notably that mass transit could never be revived. It studied 
transit corridors, looked at existing rights-of-way, and crunched potential ridership numbers125.  
 
But the task force’s two biggest contributions were epochal. First, it embodied a completely new 
ethic that was jelling in the region among a critical mass of young local and newly arrived 
planners and politicians: that decisions should first be made about urban form, and then about 
transportation systems – and investments – needed to achieve the form126. Second, the ask force 
created a seat of power to drive the new ethic, and in so doing it brought together Goldschmidt 
and Jackson. This may be the single defining moment of transportation planning history in 
Oregon.  
 
Reading two accounts of the era, by Florida State University light-rail scholar Gregory L. 
Thompson, is like eating rich candy127. For his 2004 and 2007 papers, Thompson drew on 
Bonner’s interviews and also reinterviewed, in depth, Bonner’s subjects and many others. 
Thompson’s description of interconnections and motivations among the era’s brain trust is 
remarkable. His perspective and conclusions are also those of an outsider seeking to break 
through outsiders’ usual frustrated jealousy of Portland’s and Oregon’s specialness, in order to 
find lessons broadly applicable. 
 
Thompson thought to drill into the brains of Drummond and mayoral aide Doug Wright about 
Goldschmidt and Jackson. Here is what he found: 
 
According to Drummond, Jackson, a road-builder and Republican, grew fond of Goldschmidt, a 
Democrat and neighborhood activist, because Goldschmidt understood the exercise of power, and 
Goldschmidt returned the admiration128. ... 
 
... Wright, who closely worked with Jackson, observed [that he] was very respectful of Neil and of 
the city council and of the direction that the city seemed to be moving ... his attitude was, let’s let 
this young mayor see what he can do129.   
 
The relationship also had a dark side. According to Drummond: 
 
A lot of decisions that made projects go forward were decided upon and then the public process 
occurred to sort of put the gloss of acceptability on them. I attended several breakfasts with Glenn 
Jackson and Neil Goldschmidt where they decided where they wanted something to head ....130 
 
For Thompson, a key lesson was that power brokers will be power brokers, and special Portland 
was never an exception. Two related lessons, however, were that power brokers such as 
Goldschmidt can be informed by and represent neighborhood interests, and that this particular 
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combination of mutually admiring yet disparate power brokers ultimately served Portland very 
well, creating a “true synthesis of interests.” 131    
 
This is not to say that Jackson ever relished losing the Mt. Hood Freeway, but he eventually 
accepted it – and the fact symbolizes the David-and-Goliath story that Katelyn Hale and other 
young Portlanders seize on today. Thompson drills into the anti-Mt.-Hood-Freeway activists’ 
circle as well – so does Hale – finding its origins in two small, independent groups that joined 
forces. The first group sprang directly from the successful work done against Harbor Drive in 
1969 by Riverfront for People. One of its founders, Jim Howell, hooked up with Buel, who had 
come west to work on Goldschmidt’s campaign. They named their group Sensible 
Transportation Options for People, or STOP132.  
 
“Isn't that a great acronym? I wish I had thought it up,” said Betty Merten to Ernie Bonner133. 
Merten, who anchored the other group opposed to the Mt. Hood, had led the charge against 
downtown’s Meier & Frank parking lot, a fight that galvanized her group to focus on air 
pollution. Merten’s husband, Charlie, an attorney, filed a lawsuit asserting that required 
processes had not been followed in selecting the Mt. Hood’s corridor. Together they named their 
group the Southeast Legal Defense Fund. By the time the groups joined forces under the STOP 
banner, leaders included Elsa Coleman and Steve Schell134.  
 
STOP reacted plain and simple to the devastation that the Mt. Hood Freeway would wreak upon 
its members’ corner of Portland. A picture is worth a thousand words: the ‘60s-vintage virtual 
rendering on Hale’s cover page shows a giant Marquam Bridge doubled in width, multiple ramps 
with a malevolent science-fiction look, and the freeway itself an enormous white swath where 
several east-west streets exist today. A total of 1,679 houses would have been demolished135. 
 
STOP had Goldschmidt; with the task force it had him positioned to influence Jackson. It would 
need both. Proponents of the Mt. Hood, led by City Commissioner Ivancie, County 
Commissioner Dan Mosee, and multiple east-county interests, wanted to put a referral on the 
ballot. Polls showed they would win 10 to 1 if that happened136. But STOP had four other 
powerful allies: NEPA, SOM, the 1973 Highway Act, and Don Clark. 
 
NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, was passed by Congress in 1969 following five 
years of debate about environmental impacts from large-scale development projects. Concern 
over the effect of roads, particularly freeways, had forced action from the federal Bureau of 
Public Roads not long after publication of Silent Spring. In the mid-’60s, the agency required 
evaluation of alternative routes, and the 1968 Highway Act prescribed public hearings for urban 
freeways as well as consideration of economic, social, and environmental effects of routing137. 
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NEPA, introduced by Washington Sen. Henry Jackson in the first days of a reluctant Nixon 
administration, expanded review into something taken for granted today: the Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS).  
 
The Oregon Department of Transportation, or ODOT (renamed and reorganized from the Oregon 
State Highway Department in 1969), was responsible for the Mt. Hood’s EIS, and despite strong 
sentiment within the department in favor of the freeway, Director George Baldwin took the task 
seriously138. ODOT retained the firm Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM) to conduct it. “An 
architectural firm!” said Baldwin, who worked for SOM on the Mt. Hood EIS139. The project 
was “under a discipline that took account of more aspects of a city” compared to engineers, 
Baldwin observed. 
 
“NEPA had a huge impact on the Mt. Hood Freeway,” Baldwin continued. The SOM team 
“looked 1.5 miles on either side, looked at home prices. How many [would] change to rentals? 
What would happen if you did transit? We insisted that if there was an interchange, there had to 
be a benefit. NEPA said that; SB 100 did also. ... If you build a transportation system, you have 
to see how it enriches the community.” SOM analysts began to see that the Mt. Hood did not.  
 
The firm’s influence went further. When Thompson did some drilling into the head of Ernie 
Munch, an SOM team member who would later go to work for Goldschmidt, he learned that 
Munch and others had leaked negative findings to the City and the activists140. ODOT engineers 
became belligerent. “It was a crazy, paranoid time,” said George Crandall, another SOM team 
member. “One ODOT engineer would write sarcastic remarks all over our work; it was not 
rational. There is kind of an untold story. The positives just weren’t there. The freeway dumping 
into downtown? Impossible.”141 NEPA was trashing the Mt. Hood – as it might have done many 
earlier freeways had it been given the chance. 
 
In 1973, with the national interstate system nearly complete and urban anti-freeway pressure 
peaking, the federal government passed a new Highway Act allowing states to cancel unpopular 
freeways and keep the money for use on other freeways – or for transit projects. The passage 
date was August 1973, three months after the task force convened. The effect was 
transformative; without this “interstate transfer” provision, Thompson believes, the Mt. Hood 
would have ended up being built142: what local government could justify foregoing $155 million 
earmarked for contractors? The act also allowed, for the first time, expenditure of Highway Trust 
Fund money on transit projects. Baldwin recalls a 1972 memo with information from U.S. 
Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe anticipating the shift. “In our SOM office, we’d get 
the policies first,” Baldwin said; the memo caused the state to ask SOM to include a transit-only 
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option in its EIS143. Finally, the 1973 Act mandated that states obtain local approval for urban 
freeways. Portland could now trump ODOT.  
 
So could Multnomah County, and the chair of its Board of Commissioners, Don Clark, was on 
board to do so. Clark was an early proponent of the land-use-first, transportation-planning-
second ethic. Along with a local booster named Larry Griffith, he was among the first in Portland 
to espouse European-style light rail.  Clark came to abhor the impacts of modern freeway 
building, going so far as to use his board coalition to block completion of I-205 across his 
Multnomah County jurisdiction144. 
 
Shortly after SOM completed its report to ODOT in December 1973, finding that negatives 
outweighed positives for building the Mt. Hood, the Governor’s Task Force recommended 
rejecting all alternatives that required demolition of any houses. At this point, Buel went to Clark 
asking that the County be the first to rescind its approval of the freeway since Goldschmidt felt 
too politically vulnerable to do so145 (despite the task force’s decision). In February 1974, 
Charlie Merten won his case against the Mt. Hood in federal court, blocking the state from 
proceeding in any case. In the same month, the County Commission rescinded its previous 
approval, and that summer the City followed suit. At the County hearing, as Thompson recounts 
it: 
 
[Clark] did not know if the county had the legal authority [but] realized that he indeed had that 
power when, as the meeting was about to begin, Jackson walked into the chamber accompanied by 
George Baldwin, director of the ODOT ... [W]itness after witness spoke against the freeway, many 
with damaging information from the EIS. Jackson spoke but only to say that the federal interstate 
money ... had better be kept in the region. When the meeting broke up ... he turned to me and he 
says, “Clark, I hope you know what you’re doing.”146   
 
By the end of the year, Governor McCall, near the end of his administration, notified the federal 
government that the Mt. Hood Freeway was to be deleted from the interstate system. The effort 
to mount a ballot measure or seek referral from the legislature never materialized; opposition 
would continue, but would fade once it was definite that money and jobs would indeed remain in 
Oregon. The stage was set for final acts of the Mt. Hood drama: the long and winding road 
leading to the choice of light rail, as opposed to that also-ran from L.A., busways – which even 
Goldschmidt initially favored; final resolution of Clark’s hatred of the I-205, in a deal with 
Glenn Jackson; the ‘70s Portland anti-freeway movement’s last stand in withdrawing the I-505; 
and the region’s financial dance of joy over its fortune in coming into hundreds of millions of 
dollars to spend on transit and, as it turned out, other road projects.        
 
Thompson’s assessment is that although the moves in withdrawing the Mt. Hood were made by 
power brokers, the activist uprising led by STOP influenced both them and their bureaucracies. 
And, the big revolution brought about by the withdrawal was local government regaining control 
of its own transportation planning and future. The Mt. Hood was dead; so was the interstate era. 
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15.0  SENATE BILL 100 AND GOAL 12 
 
The defeat of the Mt. Hood Freeway, in Portland, and the political events leading up to it, 
directly affected land use and transportation planning at the state level. As the Department of 
Land Conservation and Development’s (DLCD’s) website puts it, “[t]his was a transformational 
event that mark[ed] the end of freeway construction and the beginning of serious efforts to 
integrate land use and transportation planning. At the time, it was a revolutionary change; it 
adopted an entirely untried solution and led to subsequent efforts to use transportation 
investments to achieve land use objectives.”147 
 
A central point of connection between activists and officials in Portland and those in Salem was 
the state-level team convened to draft land use planning goals, as prescribed by SB 100. Greg 
Baldwin remembered this as a key connection, but also as only one in a network of connections. 
He described the nature of communication within the transportation planning community at the 
time: 
 
There were a lot of coincidental things; a lot complementary. [Contact] was instructive, not 
strategic; there was crossover. The CRAG board met every two weeks; it had Neil Goldschmidt, 
who had multiple roles; my father [George Baldwin, state Department of Transportation director] 
was on there [too]. It’s not surprising there’d be coordination with what was undertaken by staff at 
ODOT. L.B. Day [the first Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) chair] was 
close to all the people on the Oregon Transportation Commission. Glenn Jackson saw my father 
every other day. ... There was lots of casual if not formal communication. Steve [Schell] was on 
STOP and developing goals and guidelines for the LCDC and trying landmark cases in the law that 
was emerging. Steve founded a small firm, EDI, with Russ Beaton and Glen O’Dell. Russ chaired a 
goals committee; they were all writing the goals; information flowed freely.148 
 
Arnold Cogan, who had been chosen by Governor Tom McCall as the state’s first planning 
director149, was now chosen by the just-convened LCDC as director of the new state planning 
office, the DLCD. Among the statutory provisions of SB100, the commission was charged with 
crafting and adopting, by the end of 1974, statewide planning “Goals” in accord with SB 100. It 
fell to Cogan and his staff to co-create the process and the substance of the goals. Their scheme 
for doing so was to be highly input-based. “I rented two vans and we outfitted these vans for 
workshops and we went on the road,” Cogan said. “For a whole year, we went on the road. ... We 
said that this program was going to be built from the bottom up ... I don't know how many times 
I made that speech.”150 The effort, according to Cogan, involved three mailings to 100,000 
randomly selected citizens151, and three sets of meetings, the first two in 35 different towns, the 
final set consisting of 10 regional public hearings required by SB100. The statewide meetings 
would become a key moment in the often-told story of the program’s creation. 
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Asked by Bonner whether DLCD staff went out the first time with draft language in place, 
Cogan replied, “[w]e didn't have any drafts ... just the language of Senate Bill 100.” For 
transportation, as for most of the goals, much time and ink had been spent on issues and policy, 
at least since the drafting of Senate Bill 10 in 1969. Yet SB-100’s topic-specific language was as 
sparse as could be:  
 
[SECTION 48] 215.515. (1) Comprehensive physical planning, adopted by the commission prior to 
the expiration of one year ... should provide guidance for physical development within the state 
responsive to economic development, human resource development, natural resource development 
and regional and metropolitan area development. ... The plans should set a pattern upon which state 
agencies and local government may base their programs and local area plans. Goals for 
comprehensive physical planning [include] ... 
[(6)] (g) To provide and encourage a safe, convenient and economic transportation system 
including all modes of transportation: Air, water, rail, highway and mass transit, and recognizing 
differences in the social costs in the various modes of transportation. 
 
This was, in fact, the same transportation language that had been included in SB 10. It became 
the starting point for creation of Transportation Goal 12, one of 19 Goals that would function as 
the new program’s constitution, with the first LCDC serving as the constitution’s framers, aided 
by DLCD. SB 100 passed and was signed by McCall on May 29, 1973. The Governor’s Task 
Force had been announced 26 days earlier. The LCDC, under Day, convened in October and 
crafted goals over the next 14 months; the Governor’s Task Force’s final report, dated January 
1975, followed completion of the goals by days or weeks. The two policy- (and history-) making 
bodies existed at precisely the same moment in time.  
 
Although both channeled debates that had preceded them for years, by early 1974, as the LCDC 
began its work in earnest, the task force was far along with its own and had, in preparation for 
recommending withdrawal of the Mt. Hood, already crafted the basis for multimodal 
transportation planning, substituting transit assumptions for PVMATS’ highway-centric data.  
 
Details are incomplete concerning the evolution of statewide Goal 12, from a sentence in SB100; 
through “crossover” from the evolving task force and CRAG efforts; to DLCD iterations 
appropriate to urban and rural areas, presented in 35 towns; and then to the final version adopted 
in December 1974. More details are certainly extant.  
 
Documents in the state archives and in possession of retired planner Jim Knight, who staffed the 
goal-writing process along with Brent Lake, Walt McCollum and Herb Riley, outline the 
progression. A memo prepared for the June 28, 1974 commission meeting shows draft goal 
development steps proposed following the first round of outreach (in Cogan’s vans). DLCD staff 
proposed putting off much of goal and guideline development until 1975. One sample goal 
attached was the Transportation goal, which read in part: 
 
Oregon’s transportation system, to be truly intermodal [shall/should] be structured to promote the 
maximum degree of fiscal and program flexibility to guarantee that the allocation of transportation 
resources shall proceed in a manner which will achieve the greatest return on the public’s 
investment. 
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The Oregon Transportation Commission, in full accordance with state law, [shall/should] develop 
and maintain a state transportation policy and comprehensive long-range plan for a multi-modal 
transportation system in the state ... 
 
ODOT, special transportation districts and state, county and city planning agencies [shall/should] 
demonstrate in their plans and programs acknowledgement that transportation exerts a significant 
influence over the air, water, noise and visual environment [and] strongly defines the character and 
direction of an area’s land use patterns ...152 
 
The draft unified transportation goal (incorporating both highways and mass transit) was wordy 
and vague, running to nearly six double-spaced pages. Cogan has said that advisory committees 
wrote most of the language153. Steve Schell, serving as LCDC’s vice-chair under Day, 
remembers staff being responsible. “Planners are compromisers; I was in law and interested in 
what it would change,” he said154. Schell remembers what happened at a subsequent summer 
1974 commission meeting (perhaps on June 28 but probably later): 
 
It was a knock-down, drag-out meeting. We’d been out and toured the state; the [LCDC] members 
were in on numerous meetings. Staff came back with general goals; I, along with [fellow 
commissioners] Paul Rudy and Dorothy Anderson, said, these are too generalized! L.B. said, use 
the goals from 1969. I said, they haven’t worked! ... We started to debate this. After two hours, I 
leaned to L.B. and said, you have the votes [to proceed with the draft goals], but he said, no, keep 
talking. After five or six hours, we decided to appoint committees [to strengthen the goals].155 
 
A draft of goals prepared in time for the commission’s July 26 meeting split transportation into 
two components, freeways and mass transit, and kept each of the two resulting goals (Nos. 10 
and 11) to barely more than a page. An excerpt from the freeways goal:  
 
Goal Subject #10 – Freeways and Major Highways ... are vital to growth and development [but] can 
stimulate uncontrolled growth and urban sprawl ... There has been an overwhelming reliance on the 
automobile and lack of adequate alternative means of transportation in urban areas. Federal funding 
has placed an emphasis on development of interstate and intercity highways ...  
 
OVERALL GOAL: The location and development of freeways and major highways ... guided by 
transportation plans which consider use of automobile, mass transit and other modes, which have 
been integrated with comprehensive land use plans, and which have been coordinated with state and 
local economic, environmental, and energy programs ... 
 
The length was gone, but the vagueness remained. The commission considered a slightly 
changed version at its meeting on August 27. Meanwhile, according to Schell, Cogan and Day 
had published a list of potential goal advisory committee members, to which Schell objected. “I 
said, you’re appointing state agency heads! We need people who’ll make changes. They said, if 
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you’re so smart, you appoint the committees.”156 Not long after the August 27 meeting, Schell 
initiated exactly that; in an August 30 memo to fellow commissioners he wrote: 
 
I have some strong misgivings about going to the public with this set of goals ... [E]ven from my 
limited knowledge of a few of these subjects, there is very little attention to either the actual 
problems or the possible solutions. ... It appears that there is neither a clear understanding of the 
problem or of the facts involved or of consequences of that goal. ... [I propose] that a technical 
committee be appointed for each of the goal subject areas ... with instructions to report back ... not 
later than October 1, 1974.157 
 
Schell proposed one-page goals, “for use in public workshops,” each of which would “(a) State 
the problems; (b) Provide three alternative solutions based on different balances between 
conservation and development; (c) State relevant facts and environmental, economic, social and 
energy consequences.” It is not clear which versions of goals were taken out for the second 
round of meetings.  
 
Schell proposed five names for each of two transportation technical committees, including a 
combination of ODOT, STOP, agency and private-sector people. Buel was proposed; so were 
Blumenauer and Greg Baldwin158.  
 
But in the event, the process started off on a considerably different tack. Perhaps in response to a 
September 6 memo from the Association of Oregon Counties, proposing its own names for the 
technical committees, a separate, overarching Technical Advisory Coordinating Committee 
(TACC) was first formed. It consisted of 24 members representing with precise equality state 
and local government, environmental and economic interests159.  
 
For a September 18 TACC meeting in Portland, Schell refined his goal-by-goal “Suggested 
Technical Committees.” The TACC divided itself into six subcommittees, each responsible for 
two goals. In a September 24 memo to the finally selected members of the technical committees 
(in this instance called Advisory Resource People), Cogan thanked them and told them they’d be 
consulted, by the TACC, “to obtain diverse choices in each of the eleven goal areas.” 
 
The TACC’s and the technical committees’ work, conducted over the next two weeks, led to 
deep changes in the goals. “Earlier this Fall,” said a November 1 memo (from Schell this time), 
“technical committees were established to draft additional problem statements and goal 
alternatives. ... [T]his work was largely concluded in early October, [and] the Commission, at its 
October 11 meeting, made significant changes in the goals [sic] subjects.” The changes meant 
the technical committees had to be reconvened in order to ratify them160. 
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Time was growing short. According to Schell’s memo, at the October 11 meeting the 
commission saw both the first-round TACs’ work and “initial results of Round II of the citizen 
workshops.” They reduced the number of goals from 11 to 10, combining the two transportation 
goals, and then staff “strengthened the ... goals by incorporating significant portions of the TAC 
work. On October 24, the LCDC approved the revised [goals] and directed the staff to proceed 
with the printing and distribution ... for the upcoming statewide public hearings scheduled for 
middle and late November.”161    
 
In a blitz of meetings with the reconvened – and expanded – TACs (the groups’ final 
configuration appeared in a November 5 memo from Knight and Lake162), the goals got their 
final imprimatur from the broadest possible representation of interests. It is not clear how much 
of the third-round changes came from the original TACs (or the TACC), how much from the 
public, and how much from Schell, the commission, and DLCD staff. But the goals were much 
evolved for final public hearings and for adoption on December 27.  
 
Goal 12 in its final form was just over two single-spaced pages. It began with the overall goal, 
“to provide and encourage a safe, convenient and economic transportation system.” This was 
followed with the words, “A transportation plan shall,” with nine specific prescriptions for local 
comprehensive plans, which would be required under SB 100. Next came five definitions and, 
finally, six planning guidelines and four implementation guidelines peppered with “should”s 
instead of “shall”s but with great specificity for local plan developers.  
 
“Steve Schell was the driver,” Knight said of the technical committees. “He wanted buy-in from 
opinion leaders .... The committees had very successful people with opposing strong views. ... 
Steve was cerebral and L.B. was political; he cared less about the fine points. Steve had the 
intellect to see the implications.”163 
 
Cogan, architect of the statewide outreach, got caught crosswise to what he later described as 
Day’s efforts to “make sure that he had solidified his control of things.”164 Cogan lost his job in 
December or January, and left in February 1975. Adoption of the goals occurred on December 
27, days before the end of McCall’s second and final term as governor. The beginnings of the 
goals’ implementation, and Cogan’s departure, would occur in the first days of the new 
administration of Democrat Robert Straub. Knight remembers McCall and Straub sitting 
shoulder to shoulder at the historic December 27 goal-adoption hearing.  
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